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“MORAL MONSTERS” UNDER THE BED:  
HOLDING CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR 
VIOLATIONS OF THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE AFTER 
KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO. 
Mara Theophila*
 
 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides foreign plaintiffs with the sole 
means of obtaining jurisdiction in U.S. courts for alleged human rights 
abuses.  These plaintiffs increasingly seek to hold corporations accountable 
for complicity in some of the most notorious violations of international law 
occurring overseas.  Prior to 2010, U.S. courts routinely entertained ATS 
claims against corporations without question.  Yet, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
recently held that the ATS does not provide foreign plaintiffs redress 
against corporate entities.  The Second Circuit relied solely on 
international law in making this finding. 
This Note examines whether international or domestic law should control 
a court’s determination of which defendants may be held liable under the 
ATS.  This Note analyzes the established choice of law principles for 
determining what constitutes a “violation of the law of nations” and the 
recent split between circuits on who can be liable for such a violation.  
From this discussion, this Note advocates a new approach to choice of law 
principles based on the difference between conduct and remedies under the 
ATS.  The U.S. Supreme Court undoubtedly requires lower courts to 
consider international law in determining whether a defendant’s conduct 
violates international law.  Once this is established, domestic law provides 
the means for holding that defendant—whether an individual or corporate 
entity—accountable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
U.S. common law has treated corporations as “persons” since the early 
republic by vesting corporate entities with many of the same rights and 
responsibilities as any individual.1  The U.S. Supreme Court continues to 
expand the parameters of the rights encompassed by this corporate 
personhood.2  During its 2009 Term, the Court struck down a federal law 
limiting corporate political campaign contributions as too burdensome on a 
corporation’s First Amendment rights.3  This Term, the Court considered 
the merits of further extending to corporations the rights of privacy,4 
mandatory arbitration,5 and due process.6
Yet, quite the opposite has resulted within the context of the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS).
  As the Court becomes 
increasingly sympathetic to corporate rights, one would expect that with 
these rights would come greater corporate responsibilities. 
7  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, along 
with two district courts, recently denied the ability of U.S. courts to ever 
hold corporate “persons” liable for violations of the law of nations under 
the ATS.8  This seemingly contradictory outcome results from the courts’ 
novel applications of international law to determine whether a corporation 
can violate the ATS.9
 
 1. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“A 
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of 
law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of 
its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”). 
  Prior to September 2010, courts adjudicating ATS 
 2. See Adam Liptak, Justices To Examine Rights of Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
29, 2010, at A20; Lyle Denniston, Analysis:  The Personhood of Corporations, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/analysis-the-
personhood-of-corporations/. 
 3. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010). 
 4. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1180–81 (2011) (considering whether 
corporate documents fall within an exception to the Freedom of Information Act). 
 5. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 
sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (asking whether 
courts must enforce a provision within a corporate contract that requires a consumer to waive 
the right to file a class action lawsuit). 
 6. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 567 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 
2009), cert. granted sub nom. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) 
(questioning whether the government can constitutionally invoke the state secrets doctrine to 
prevent a corporate contractor from defending itself). 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  In accordance with judicial practice, this Note will use the 
phrases “law of nations” and “customary international law” interchangeably. See, e.g., 
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A violation of the law 
of nations is broadly understood as a violation of the norms of customary international 
law.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 1, ch. 
2, intro. note (1987) (“[T]he law of nations [is] later referred to as international law . . . .”). 
 8. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010); Flomo 
v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810, 815–16 (S.D. Ind. 2010); Viera v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., No. 1:09-cv-0495, 2010 WL 3893791, at *1–3 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010); Doe 
v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010). 
 9. Judge Pierre N. Leval issued a strongly worded concurrence in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit case, which laid out his frustration with both the reasoning of 
the majority, and the injustice that would occur as a result. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 150–51 
(Leval, J., concurring). 
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claims uniformly applied domestic concepts of corporate liability and did so 
without question in the overwhelming majority of cases.10  In Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,11 the Second Circuit rejected application of 
domestic law as “entirely irrelevant” to determining who is capable of 
violating international law.12  In denying the plaintiffs’ request for 
rehearing, Judge Dennis G. Jacobs countered the fears that the decision 
would give “absolution to moral monsters.”13  He described these “moral 
monsters” as humans, who may still be brought to justice following the 
Kiobel decision.14  However, as this Note demonstrates, the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation of the ATS unjustifiably conflates the threshold 
question of what constitutes a violation with the secondary issue of who can 
be held liable under the statute.15
This Note draws from these recent and largely unexamined opinions to 
provide a better understanding of which body of law governs the question 
of whether corporate defendants can be liable under the ATS.  To do so, 
Part I of this Note describes the basic choice of law guidelines laid out by 
the Supreme Court and the way in which lower courts attempt to apply 
these principles.  Next, Part II examines the divergent approaches taken by 
courts in determining whether a corporate entity can be held liable for a 
violation of the law of nations.  From this discussion, Part III argues that 
lower courts should adopt a new approach to identifying whether 
international or domestic law governs an issue arising under the ATS.  This 
Note concludes that the principles laid out by the Supreme Court command 
that if a corporate entity violates international standards of conduct, 
domestic law supplies the means for holding that corporation accountable. 
 
I.  THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE, SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, AND CHOICE OF 
LAW PRINCIPLES 
Courts struggle to adjudicate ATS claims according to a consistent set of 
principles.  Much of this difficulty stems from the lack of a clear 
understanding of the purpose behind the ATS.  Part I.A of this Note 
provides a brief overview of the background surrounding the enactment of 
the ATS and the Supreme Court’s single attempt to clarify the principles 
underpinning the statute.  Part I.B describes the way that lower courts 
 
 10. See id. at 161 & n.12 (listing the courts imposing liability on corporations). 
 11. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 12. Id. at 118 n.11. 
 13. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2011 WL 
338048, at *4 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011) (Jacobs, J., concurring). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra Part III.A.  Following the Kiobel opinion, Professor Kenneth Anderson 
framed the issue before the Second Circuit in similar terms. See Kenneth Anderson, Extra 
Thoughts on Today’s 2nd Circuit ATS Decision, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2010, 10:49 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/extra-thoughts-on-todays-2nd-circuit-ats-decision/.  
Specifically, Anderson described the question before the court as whether the legal qualities 
of “who” violates the ATS are relevant after a court determines that “what” constitutes a 
violation is satisfied by the defendant’s conduct. Id.  This Note offers an independent 
analysis of the question while utilizing Anderson’s language—the “who” and the “what”—to 
frame the issue. 
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utilize these principles to determine what constitutes a violation under the 
ATS.  Lastly, Part I.C summarizes the widely varied approaches to deciding 
who can be liable for an ATS violation in the absence of clear guidance by 
the Supreme Court. 
A.  The Development of ATS Jurisprudence 
The First Congress of the United States passed the ATS as one sentence 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789.16  The statute provides that “[t]he district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”17  The debates surrounding the adoption of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 did not reference the ATS, and there is little evidence of the 
drafters’ intent behind this sentence.18  Described as a “legal Lohengrin,” 
the ATS was perceived as an “old but little used section,” which “no one 
seems to know whence it came.”19  As a result, there existed little 
understanding of, or use for, the ATS following its enactment.20
Although minimal, there were two notable exceptions to this 
characterization during the years immediately following the ATS’s 
enactment.
 
21  First, in Bolchos v. Darrel,22 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of South Carolina assumed that the ATS provided a supplemental 
basis for jurisdiction over an admiralty suit for damages brought by a 
French privateer against a mortgagee of a British slave ship.23  
Furthermore, in 1795, Attorney General William Bradford advised the State 
Department on whether American citizens who took part in the destruction 
of a British slave colony could be subject to criminal liability.24
 
 16. Ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).  
Congress has slightly modified the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) on a number of occasions since 
its original passage. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 n.10 (2004); see JENNIFER 
K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32118, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE:  LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS 5–7 (2003) (describing these minor textual 
changes). 
  Although 
 17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 18. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., 
concurring) (noting that the debates nowhere mention the provision, as far as the court was 
aware); ELSEA, supra note 16, at 2, 4–5. 
 19. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718–
19 (describing a lack of consensus in understanding the congressional intent behind the 
ATS).  For a comprehensive examination of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of 
the ATS, see William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts 
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986); Kenneth C. 
Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims:  Inquiries into the Alien Tort 
Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (1985). 
 20. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718–19; Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015. 
 21. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); Breach of 
Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795).  For a discussion of how these incidents 
inform an understanding of the scope of the ATS, see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720–21; BETH 
STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 6–7 (2d ed. 
2008); Randall, supra note 19, at 48–52. 
 22. 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607). 
 23. See id. at 810–11. 
 24. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. at 58–59.  
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Bradford expressed doubt regarding the citizens’ criminal culpability, he 
opined that a federal court would be willing to entertain the foreign 
plaintiffs’ civil claims under the ATS.25  Despite this decree, the ATS lay 
nearly dormant for the next 200 years.26
A 1978 complaint filed in a district court within the Second Circuit 
ushered in the modern era of ATS litigation.
 
27  In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,28 
two Paraguayan nationals brought suit against a former Paraguayan police 
officer then residing in the United States.29  Invoking jurisdiction under the 
ATS, the plaintiffs alleged that the former officer had kidnapped and 
tortured a family member in violation of international law.30  The U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the claim for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.31  On appeal, the Second Circuit 
reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that “[a]lthough the Alien Tort 
Statute has rarely been the basis for jurisdiction during its long history . . . 
there can be little doubt that this action is properly brought in federal 
court.”32  The plaintiffs undeniably fulfilled the plain language of the 
statute—an action by an alien, for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations—and thus properly invoked jurisdiction under the ATS.33  
The ATS did not create new rights, but simply opened the federal courts to 
adjudication of certain substantive rights already universally accepted by 
international law.34
Following Filártiga, plaintiffs increasingly filed suits under the ATS to 
seek redress for various types of alleged violations of the law of nations.
 
35  
Despite this flurry of litigation, the Supreme Court’s 2004 opinion in Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain36
 
 25. Id. at 59 (“[T]here can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been 
injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United 
States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a 
tort only, in violation of the laws of nations . . . .”). 
 constituted the first substantive examination of the 
 26. See ELSEA, supra note 16, at 13; Casto, supra note 19, at 468 (describing the 
provision as having “lapsed into desuetude”).  For the few reported cases in which federal 
courts considered the ATS prior to 1980, see Casto, supra note 19, at 469 n.7. 
 27. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004) (characterizing Filártiga 
v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), as “the birth of the modern line of cases”); 
William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of 
International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 638 (2006). 
 28. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 29. Id. at 878. 
 30. Id. at 878–79. 
 31. Id. at 879–80. 
 32. Id. at 887. 
 33. Id. at 880, 889. 
 34. Id. at 887. 
 35. See ELSEA, supra note 16, at 15; STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 12. 
 36. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  Prior to Sosa, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, 
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, in addition to district courts within the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the First and D.C. Circuits, applied the ATS principles as outlined by Filártiga. 
See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 16.  
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ATS in its 215-year history.37  The case was brought by Alvarez-Machain, 
a Mexican national, who alleged that he had been arbitrarily arrested and 
detained in Mexico by Mexican authorities and by an agent of the United 
States.38  Alvarez-Machain claimed that these actions violated the law of 
nations and he filed suit, under the ATS, in the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California.39  The district court awarded summary 
judgment and $25,000 in damages to the plaintiff on the ATS claim.40  A 
three-judge panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the ATS judgment.41  En banc, a divided court upheld the 
decision.42
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, in part, on the question of whether 
Alvarez-Machain’s abduction and detention was a violation of customary 
international law that would support an action under the ATS.
  
43  Prior to 
Sosa, a number of courts had agreed with the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of the ATS as creating a federal tort for violations of the law 
of nations.44  Backed by the United States in a supporting brief,45 Sosa 
argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under the ATS because the 
statute was not intended to grant a right of action without further 
congressional approval.46  The parties argued that the ATS solely vested the 
federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction.47
In determining the scope of the ATS, the Court first examined the 
historical evidence pertaining to the enactment of the ATS by the First 
Congress.  At the founding, the law of nations consisted of two principle 
elements:  (1) judicial and executive norms of behavior governing the 
relationship between States, and (2) common law regulating the behavior of 
individuals outside domestic boundaries.
 
48  However, there existed a sphere 
in which these rules overlapped.49  In a narrow set of offenses against the 
law of nations, such as the violations of safe conduct, ambassadorial rights, 
and piracy, individuals could seek a judicial remedy in U.S. courts.50
 
 37. Lucien J. Dhooge, Lohengrin Revealed:  The Implications of Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain for Human Rights Litigation Pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 393, 421 (2006). 
  Yet 
 38. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–98. 
 39. Id. at 697. 
 40. Id. at 699. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 712. 
 44. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 
1474–76 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the ATS “creates a cause of action for violations of 
specific, universal and obligatory international human rights standards”); Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776–82 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (adhering 
to the principles laid out in Filártiga). 
 45. See Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 11–23, Sosa, 
542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339). 
 46. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 714–15. 
 49. Id. at 715. 
 50. Id. 
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the conduct could also have serious implications on foreign relations.51  It is 
within this purview that the members of the First Congress drafted the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.52
The First Congress likely enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789 to reinforce 
the Court’s original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and 
diplomats under Article III of the Constitution.
 
53  The Sosa Court made two 
assumptions regarding the intent of the First Congress.  First, the Court 
found it unlikely that the very Congress empowering federal courts with 
jurisdiction over claims alleging a violation of international law would not 
take further action to create a cause of action for such claims.54  Second, the 
First Congress likely intended the ATS to have “practical effect the moment 
it became law” for a limited number of violations.55  These violations 
included those torts recognized by the First Congress as existing at the 
intersection between individual remedies and foreign relations, including 
offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy 
claims.56  Although the ATS is a purely jurisdictional statute, the Court 
concluded that it was “enacted on the understanding that the common law 
would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law 
violations.”57
Next, the Court rejected Sosa’s argument that the scope of international 
law violations cognizable in ATS litigation was limited to those recognized 
in 1789.
 
58  The Court acknowledged that, under Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,59 federal courts have no authority to derive general common law 
(the Erie Doctrine).60
 
 51. Id. 
  However, the Erie Doctrine does not bar all judicial 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 717.  The Framers of the Constitution vested the U.S. Supreme Court with 
original jurisdiction over “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and 
Consuls” in response to the increasing concern that the federal government lacked the 
judicial powers to manage effectively matters of an international character. U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 2; see also Randall, supra note 19, at 19 (explaining the intent behind the ATS as “to 
establish and extend the power of the federal judiciary over actions affecting foreign affairs 
and involving aliens”). 
 54. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719. 
 55. Id. at 720, 724. 
 56. Id.; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68 (identifying these 
offenses as law of nations violations). 
 57. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
 58. Id. at 712; see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 35 (characterizing the Court 
as rejecting this “extreme interpretation”); Casto, supra note 27, at 645 (noting that if the 
plaintiffs could only bring claims for torts recognized in 1789, the ATS “would be little more 
than an antiquarian oddity”). 
 59. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  Erie involved the question of whether a federal court could 
disregard the common law rules of a state in cases of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 71.  Federal 
courts previously exercised independent judgment as to what the common law of the state 
was or should have been. Id.  However, the resulting difference between state and federal 
adjudication within a jurisdiction caused plaintiffs to forum shop and resulted in inequitable 
administration of the laws. See id. at 75.  In light of these concerns, Erie held that courts had 
no power to make general federal common law and, instead, must apply the laws of the state 
where the court sits in diversity cases. Id. at 77–78. 
 60. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the 
majority had manufactured new federal common law, contrary to Erie. Id. at 746–47 (Scalia, 
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recognition of new substantive rules.61  Federal courts may derive some 
substantive law in limited circumstances.62  Courts have been doing so for 
two centuries by recognizing the law of nations as part of federal common 
law.63
Yet the Court repeatedly emphasized the need for judicial caution in 
recognizing any new cause of action under the law of nations.
 
64  In 
particular, the Court acknowledged the following factors as counseling 
toward limited recognition of ATS actions65:  (1) the substantial element of 
discretion inherent in application of international law,66 (2) the limited role 
of the judiciary following Erie,67 (3) the superiority of legislative judgment 
in the creation of a cause of action,68 (4) the potential foreign policy 
implications of an ATS suit,69 and (5) the lack of a clear congressional 
mandate to seek out new causes of action.70  As a result, the Court premised 
its holding “on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant 
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms 
today.”71  Ultimately, the Court concluded that courts should require that 
any claim based on the present-day law of nations “rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to” the modest number of violations recognized at 
the time the ATS was enacted.72
Sosa remains the sole Supreme Court case guiding ATS jurisprudence 
within the federal court system.
 
73
 
J., concurring).  Justice Scalia claimed that, under an originalist perspective, the ATS did not 
grant courts the right to recognize new federal common law claims for violations of the law 
of nations. Id. 
  The decision put to rest the question of 
 61. Id. at 729 (majority opinion). 
 62. Id.  The Supreme Court has sanctioned the development of federal common law in 
situations involving “‘uniquely federal interests.’” Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 
500, 504 (1988) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 
(1981)).  An example of a type of case involving “uniquely federal interests” includes one 
implicating U.S. foreign policy. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 63. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729–30; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398, 426–27 (1964). 
 64. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–28. 
 65. Id. at 725–28.  For one scholar’s understanding of these factors and how they can 
provide an analytical roadmap for future ATS litigation, see Casto, supra note 27, at 645–68. 
 66. Although the legal community viewed law as able to be “found or discovered” at the 
time the ATS was enacted, Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–26, the Court explained that law is now 
acknowledged to be “a product of human choice.” Id. at 729. 
 67. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
 68. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 (“[T]he general practice has been to look for legislative 
guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law.”). 
 69. Id.; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Bork, J., concurring) (describing the possibility that an ATS suit will interfere with U.S. 
foreign affairs). 
 70. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728. 
 71. Id. at 729. 
 72. Id. at 725. 
 73. On September 30, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case brought, in 
part, under the ATS against foreign officials. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 
2282–83 (2010).  Although seen as an opportunity for the Court to scale back the expanding 
scope of the ATS, the Court rested its decision squarely on foreign sovereign immunity 
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which body of law—international or domestic—should guide the inquiry of 
what constitutes a violation of the law of nations in an ATS lawsuit.74  
Lower courts must recognize ATS claims for violations of “specific, 
universal, and obligatory” norms, as defined by customary international 
law.75  Yet the Court left district courts to grapple with the question of 
which body of law applies to define the potential perpetrators of a violation 
of the law of nations.76
Considering the principles laid out in Sosa, the next section of Part I 
examines the well-settled use of international law in identifying an ATS 
violation.  The remaining section, Part I.C, explores the widely varied 
choice of law principles courts have applied to determine who, in the 
absence of guidance by the Supreme Court, can be liable under the ATS and 
the disparities that occur as a result. 
 
B.  Use of International Law To Determine what Qualifies as a “Violation 
of the Law of Nations” 
A threshold question in any ATS case is whether the tort alleged by the 
plaintiff is a violation of the law of nations.77  In the wake of Sosa, courts 
must examine customary international law to determine whether the alleged 
tort is actionable under the ATS.78  While the use of the ATS to redress 
international law violations may be perceived as novel, the incorporation of 
customary international law into federal common law was long settled prior 
to Sosa.79
 
grounds. See Duncan Hollis, ATS vs. FSIA, ATS Wins?, OPINIO JURIS (June 1, 2010, 6:15 
PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/01/ats-vs-fsia-ats-wins/ (“[H]uman rights activists 
should be breathing a huge sigh of relief tonight.  The Court had a chance here to gut the 
ATS, and it declined to do so.”). 
  Part I.B.1 identifies the sources of international law examined by 
courts.  Part I.B.2 discusses the way courts apply international law to ATS 
litigation. 
 74. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 21; Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits 
on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 278 (2009). 
 75. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights 
Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 76. See infra Part.I.C. 
 77. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per 
stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 40. 
 78. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to 
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 740–43 (1939); supra notes 62–63 and 
accompanying text (discussing Sosa’s conclusion that use of international sources of law has 
long been recognized within the U.S. court system). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the 
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 849–70 (1997) (arguing that the Erie Doctrine 
abandoned the tradition of recognizing customary international law within federal common 
law). 
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1.  Sources of International Law To Be Considered by U.S. Courts 
The Supreme Court’s 1900 ruling in The Paquete Habana80 held that the 
judiciary must recognize customary international law as U.S. federal 
common law under certain circumstances.81  Where no posited law 
controlled, a court must resort to the “customs and usages of civilized 
nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, 
who by years of labor . . . have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted 
with the subjects.”82  In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has 
continually affirmed the principle that domestic courts must acknowledge 
certain sources of international law.83
The method described in The Paquete Habana is consistent with the 
modern way courts identify principles of customary international law.
 
84  
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ 
Statute)85 has been recognized as the leading authority on sources of 
international law within the United States.86  The ICJ Statute provides four 
types of authorities that a court should consider when determining 
international law.87  Although not everything that fits under this framework 
qualifies as international law, these sources provide the means for proving 
whether a rule has in fact attained status as international law.88
According to the ICJ Statute, a court must apply the general and 
particular rules established within binding international conventions.
 
89  
However, in the absence of a binding treaty, customary international law 
provides an additional source of international authority.90
 
 80. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
  To discern 
common practice by the international community, a court is directed to look 
at whether state practice exists across nations and whether States believe 
 81. Id. at 700–01. 
 82. Id. at 700. 
 83. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004) (turning to “those 
[international] sources we have long, albeit cautiously, recognized”); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (noting that “international disputes 
implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations” are one of the “narrow areas” in which 
federal common law exists); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 
(1964) (“United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate 
circumstances.”). 
 84. See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
8, 2010) (discussing the impact of The Paquete Habana on the reasoning of modern day 
courts). 
 85. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 86. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 132 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880–81 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1980); MALCOLM N. SHAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (5th ed. 2003). 
 87. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, art. 38(1)(a)–(d). 
 88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103 
cmt. a (1987); cf. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(describing customary international law as deriving from “myriad decisions made in 
numerous and varied international and domestic arenas” and “not . . . from any single, 
definitive, readily-identifiable source”). 
 89. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, art. 38(1)(a). 
 90. Id. art. 38(1)(b). 
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that this practice is made obligatory by the rule of law, in other words, 
opinio juris.91  Although a practice may previously not have obtained status 
as opinio juris, it is possible for “ancient usage” to “gradually ripen[] into a 
rule of international law.”92  Furthermore, the ICJ Statute instructs a court 
to consider “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”93  
Lastly, the judicial decisions and scholarship of the most highly regarded 
publicists provide further evidence of the current state of international 
law.94  Accordingly, when examining an ATS claim, federal courts are 
directed to consider these sources of international law.95
A court is entitled to consider all relevant international authorities in 
making its determination, whether or not submitted by a party.
 
96  In 
practice, a court will provide an exhaustive review of international treaties, 
court precedent, and leading scholarship.97  However, lower courts are still 
bound to apply domestic common law interpretations of international law, 
as decided by superior courts.98
2.  Application of International Law in Sosa and Lower Courts 
  This often means that a lower court is 
bound by Sosa’s examination of specific international authorities.  The next 
section discusses the ways in which the Supreme Court and lower courts 
have examined sources of international law when determining whether a 
defendant is liable. 
Courts consider a variety of international sources of law when 
determining whether a defendant violated a “specific, universal, and 
obligatory” norm of the law of nations.99
 
 91. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 
41–42, ¶ 70–73 (Feb. 20); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. c (1987).  Even if the United States was not party to a treaty, 
domestic courts may still treat treaties as binding customary law if the treaty’s obligations 
“passed into the general corpus of international law, and [are] now accepted as such by the 
opinio juris.” Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 42, ¶ 71.  
  In Sosa, the Supreme Court 
 92. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900). 
 93. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, art. 38(1)(c); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(4) (1987).  For example, the general elements 
of “natural justice,” including principles of equity and fairness, are considered a source of 
law. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50–55 (1991); 
Frances T. Freeman Jalet, The Quest for the General Principles of Law Recognized by 
Civilized Nations—A Study, 10 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1044–50 (1963). 
 94. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, art. 38(1)(d). 
 95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102 (1987) (listing similar sources); see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 
153, 160–61 (1820) (stating that the law of nations “may be ascertained by consulting the 
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of 
nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law”). 
 96. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.  Courts are generally provided with wide discretion in 
researching questions of international law. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. 
Supp. 2d 7, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 97. See infra Part III. 
 98. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160–61 
(1820). 
 99. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (quoting In re Estate of 
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
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examined a number of international sources in ultimately concluding that 
plaintiff’s brief detention by Mexican and U.S. officials did not qualify as a 
violation.100  First, the Court examined the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights101 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.102  
The Court concluded that neither source created enforceable obligations, 
opinio juris, and thus had not attained the status of binding customary 
international law.103  Next, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on a 
survey of national constitutions, an International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
decision, and domestic federal law, finding that the authorities did not 
define “arbitrary detention” with the specificity necessary for an ATS 
violation.104  Lastly, the Court found the requirement of “prolonged 
arbitrary detention,” as set out by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, to be persuasive evidence of customary 
international law.105  As a result, the Court held that Alvarez-Machain 
advanced only aspirational norms that were not defined by international law 
with enough specificity to support the creation of a federal remedy.106
Using the standard set in Sosa, lower courts turn to various sources of 
international law to define what torts are recognizable under the ATS.  It is 
now well settled that, in addition to the paradigmatic offenses recognized at 
the ATS’s enactment,
 
107 there is universal acceptance of defined 
prohibitions on torture, genocide, and certain war crimes within the 
international community to meet the Sosa standard.108  The legal 
community generally considers these actions to be jus cogens109 violations 
of the law of nations.110
 
 100. Id. at 734–38. 
 
 101. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 102. art. 9, Dec 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 103. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735; see supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (discussing the 
process in which treaties become part of customary international law).  Rather than imposing 
obligations, the treaties were viewed as articulating a set of aspirations for the international 
community. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–36.  Furthermore, the United States only ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the express understanding that it 
would not be enforceable in domestic courts. Id. 
 104. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–38 & n.27. 
 105. Id. at 737 (discussing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 702 (1987)). 
 106. Id. at 738. 
 107. See supra notes 49–52, 56 and accompanying text (identifying offenses against 
ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy as recognized at the time the ATS was 
enacted). 
 108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987); Jeffrey M. 
Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims:  
The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 90–97 
(1981). 
 109. Jus cogens refers to a “mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law 
accepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (9th ed. 2009); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. k (1987). 
 110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 cmt. n (1987); Blum 
& Steinhardt, supra note 108, at 90. 
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However, any prohibition that is a “specific, universal, and obligatory” 
norm—whether jus cogens or not—is actionable under the ATS.111  When 
considering less accepted norms, a court must determine whether the 
principles of customary international law warrant the creation of a new tort 
remedy under the ATS.112  Courts face a number of difficulties in making 
this determination.  There is still uncertainty among lower courts on how far 
international prohibitions extend.113  Furthermore, courts apply conflicting 
principles when attempting to define the elements of the violation.114  For 
example, courts recently split on the significant question of which law 
governs elements of aiding and abetting liability.115  As a result, the regime 
of aiding and abetting liability has been marked by substantial 
uncertainty.116  Additionally, courts question which sources of international 
law should be consulted and given the most weight in applying the Sosa 
standard.117  This discussion is not to say that Sosa left doubt as to which 
body of law applies when identifying a violation.118  Rather, the analysis 
highlights the challenges courts often face in adjudicating ATS claims even 
after following the principles articulated by Sosa.119
After it is established that a certain tort is actionable under the ATS, 
courts must next consider which defendants can be liable for that tort.  The 
next section discusses the various approaches available to courts to 
 
 
 111. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per 
stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
Inc. (Talisman I), 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 306 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 112. Casto, supra note 27, at 646. 
 113. See, e.g., Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 
119–23 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the prohibition on use of herbicides during the Vietnam 
War was not universally accepted or sufficiently specific to be actionable); Roe I v. 
Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1020–22  (S.D. Ind. 2007) (allowing only the 
“worst forms” of child labor to be actionable); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 
205–14 (describing the types of claims that rarely meet the Sosa standard); Chimène I. 
Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 69–70 & 
nn.33–34 (2008) (discussing cases where courts have found that the underlying violation did 
not meet the Sosa standard). 
 114. Compare Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman II), 582 
F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009) (requiring that a defendant act with purpose to meet the 
mens rea element of aiding and abetting liability), with Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 
F.3d 1148, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2005) (identifying knowledge of illegality as sufficient). 
 115. See supra note 114 (comparing the conflicting definitions of an element of aiding 
and abetting liability based on application of international or domestic law); see also Keitner, 
supra note 113, at 62. 
 116. Jonathan Drimmer, The Aiding and Abetting Conundrum Under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, LEXISNEXIS EXPERT COMMENTARY, June 2008, at 1; see also In re Sinaltrainal 
Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (describing the “pressing need for 
clarification of these issues”); Keitner, supra note 113, at 62 (“The doctrinal question of 
what standards govern accomplice liability continues to perplex courts . . . .”). 
 117. Compare Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177–87 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding 
concrete evidence that non-consensual medical experimentation violated the law of nations 
based on the Nuremberg Tribunals and incorporation into conventions, declarations, and 
domestic laws), with id. at 195–97 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidence of 
customary international law should primarily be deduced from treaties). 
 118. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 119. Cf. Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The 
question of defining ‘the law of nations’ is a confusing one which is hotly debated . . . .”). 
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determine who, in the absence of well-established choice of law principles, 
can be liable under the ATS. 
C.  Determining Who Can Be Liable for a “Violation of the Law of 
Nations” Based on International and Domestic Law 
The Supreme Court has never ruled on what categories of defendants can 
be held liable for a violation of the law of nations, nor has the Court 
indicated which body of law—domestic or international—should control 
this inquiry.  Particularly with the infusion of corporate defendants into 
ATS litigation, courts have only recently begun to analyze the question.  
Part I.C.1 identifies the Supreme Court’s limited discussion of who can be 
held liable under the ATS.  The following section, Part I.C.2, discusses the 
advent of corporations into ATS litigation.  The remaining section, Part 
I.C.3, considers the divergent treatment of corporate entities under 
international and domestic law.   
1.  The Lack of Guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court 
The Court’s holdings in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping 
Co.,120 and Sosa may be construed as offering lower courts limited 
direction on the question of who may be liable under the ATS.  In Amerada, 
the Court considered whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 (FSIA)121 afforded the Republic of Argentina immunity from an ATS 
suit and thus deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the 
claim.122  Although the Court ultimately determined that Congress intended 
the FSIA to be the sole way of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign 
sovereign, the Court briefly discussed the scope of the ATS.123  
Specifically, the Court concluded that “[t]he Alien Tort Statute by its terms 
[did] not distinguish among classes of defendants, and it of course has the 
same effect after the passage of the FSIA as before with respect to 
defendants other than foreign states.”124
 
 120. 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
 
 121. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f) 1441(d), 1602–1611 (2006).  The Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) eliminated the ability of U.S. courts to hear cases 
against sovereign governments, except under limited circumstances. Id. § 1604 (“[A] foreign 
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the 
States except as provided in [the exceptions] of this chapter.”).  Prior to the enactment of the 
FSIA, defendants often received immunity under existing common law. See Samantar v. 
Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284–86 (2010). 
 122. See Amerada, 488 U.S. at 428.  On appeal from the district court’s decision, the 
Second Circuit held that the ATS was “‘no more than a jurisdictional grant based on 
international law’” and that “‘who [was] within’ the scope of that grant was governed by 
‘evolving standards of international law.’” Id. at 433 (quoting Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. 
v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987)) (alteration added).  The Second 
Circuit concluded that the enactment of the FSIA was not meant to eliminate the ATS’s 
grant of subject matter jurisdiction to foreign plaintiffs. See id.  The Supreme Court fully 
rejected this argument. Id. at 433–35. 
 123. See id. at 438. 
 124. Id. 
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While Sosa involved an ATS claim against government officials, the 
Court explicitly referenced the possibility of suits against other types of 
defendants.125  In footnote twenty of Sosa (footnote twenty), the Court 
noted that a “related consideration” for whether a norm is sufficiently 
definite to support a cause of action “is whether international law extends 
the scope of liability . . . to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a 
private actor such as a corporation or individual.”126  In making this 
statement, the Court contrasted two opposing views on whether a private 
actor, rather than a state actor, could violate international law.127  
Furthermore, Justice Breyer’s concurrence made reference to the type of 
defendant being held accountable for violating international law.128   Justice 
Breyer interpreted the Court’s opinion as requiring that “[t]he norm . . . 
extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) the plaintiff 
seeks to sue.”129  In making this observation, Justice Breyer cited to 
footnote twenty of the majority opinion.130  As Part II of this Note will 
examine further, courts contest the relevance of footnote twenty in 
adjudicating the question of whether a corporation can violate the ATS.131
The next section identifies the changes to ATS litigation with the 
introduction of corporate defendants.  The last section of Part I.C analyzes 
the differences in corporate liability depending on whether a court applies 
domestic or international law.  
 
2.  Corporations as a New Class of Defendants 
Against this muddled legal background, foreign plaintiffs have 
increasingly brought suits against a variety of defendants for acts in 
violation of the law of nations.132  For the first fifteen years after Filártiga 
and the birth of modern ATS claims, aliens brought ATS suits in U.S. 
courts only against individuals or foreign States.133  The first ATS case 
where a plaintiff alleged that a corporate entity violated the law of nations 
was as recent as 1997.134
 
 125. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004). 
 
 126. Id. (comparing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 744, 791–95 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (holding that private actors could not be liable), with Kadic 
v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that a private actor could violate 
the law of nations)). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See infra Part II. 
 132. ELSEA, supra note 16, at 15. 
 133. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2010); see 
also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 965 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) 
(“It is the rare [ATS] case that does not involve a foreign state or official as a defendant.”), 
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); supra notes 120–24 and 
accompanying text (discussing an example of a case involving a foreign sovereign). 
 134. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116–17. 
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In Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,135 the Central District of California considered 
a complaint alleging that Unocal Corp., a U.S. oil company, acted in 
collusion with the government of Myanmar while working as a joint 
venture for construction of a gas pipeline in Burma.136  The Burmese 
plaintiffs claimed that the Burmese military had committed a number of 
international law violations during the period that they undertook the 
project.137  After the district court granted Unocal’s motion for summary 
judgment, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a corporation may be 
held liable under the ATS for knowingly providing assistance to the 
perpetrators of a crime.138
First, the court addressed the threshold question of whether the alleged 
torts of forced labor, murder, rape, and torture could qualify as violations of 
the law of nations.
 
139  Relying on international agreements and 
declarations140 and on circuit interpretations of international law,141 the 
Ninth Circuit found that these torts qualified as violations of the law of 
nations.142
Next, the court considered the additional threshold question of whether 
the alleged tort requires that the party engage in state action.
 
143  Prior to 
Unocal, the Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadžić144 clarified previous 
divided holdings on the state action requirement under the ATS.145  The 
court concluded that although individual acts of rape and torture are 
“proscribed by international law only when committed by state officials or 
under color of law,” these acts are actionable when collectively committed 
in pursuit of a larger campaign of genocide or war crimes.146  Specifically, 
these jus cogens violations are actionable under the ATS regardless of state 
action.147  Finding the Second Circuit’s reasoning persuasive, the Ninth 
Circuit held that Unocal Corp., as a private actor, could be held liable for 
the alleged torts regardless of whether the entity acted under color of 
Burmese law.148
 
 135. 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 
 136. Id. at 937. 
 137. See id. at 936–37. 
 138. Id. at 945. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 101, art. 23, among 
others). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  The argument that individuals cannot be subject to jurisdiction is based on a 
rigid understanding of international law as solely law between states. Keitner, supra note 
113, at 70. 
 144. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 145. Id. at 240 (adopting and extending Judge Harry T. Edwards’s concurrence in Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring)); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 252 (addressing Kadic’s “color of 
law” analysis). 
 146. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. 
 147. Id. at 242–44. 
 148. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945–46. 
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Although the Unocal court extended liability to corporate ATS 
defendants, the court did not distinguish between corporate entities and 
private individuals.149  Rather, the Ninth Circuit premised corporate 
liability on whether international law holds a private actor, versus a public 
actor, liable for the alleged torts.150
Since the Unocal complaint was filed in federal court, nearly 140 cases 
alleging human rights violations under the ATS have been brought against 
corporate defendants across the country.
 
151  This trend likely reflects the 
increasing attractiveness of corporate defendants to plaintiffs seeking 
redress of international law violations.152  Generally, large corporations 
have sufficient assets to make settlements or judgments more worthwhile 
for plaintiffs.153  Unlike the difficulty plaintiffs face when suing sovereign 
defendants,154 multinational corporations are not entitled to foreign 
immunities under the FSIA because they are private actors.155  Therefore, 
the plaintiffs do not see their cases dismissed on subject matter jurisdiction 
grounds like in earlier ATS actions involving claims against foreign 
governments.156  Additionally, corporations are often likely to opt for 
settlement.157
 
 149. See generally id. 
 
 150. See id. at 945–46.  Generally, the state action doctrine now requires that private 
actors act in concert with state officials or receive state aid, with the limited exceptions being 
in situations of jus cogens violations, i.e., alleged slave trading, piracy, genocide, and war 
crimes. Keitner, supra note 113, at 71; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987) (conferring jurisdiction over private 
actors for certain offenses recognized by nations “as of universal concern”); id. § 702  
(recognizing jurisdiction over a state for genocide, slavery, murder or disappearance of 
persons, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, and a pattern 
of gross violations of recognized rights); supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
 151. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Is Second Circuit Ruling a “Talisman” Against Alien Tort 
Statute Suits?, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 12, 
2010, at 1, available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/02-15-
10Drimmer_LegalBackgrounder.pdf; see also Ramsey, supra note 74, at 278–79.  Like 
Unocal, cases involving corporate defendants often rest their holdings on whether a private 
actor, as opposed to a public actor, can be held liable. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank 
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282–83 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that courts 
often treat “the issue of whether corporations may be held liable under the [ATS as] 
indistinguishable from the question of whether private individuals may be”).  Part II of this 
Note discusses the few cases explicitly addressing the question of whether a corporate entity, 
as opposed to an individual, may be liable under the ATS. See infra Part II. 
 152. Marc J. Gottridge & Matthew J. Galvin, The Alien Tort Statute:  An Introduction and 
Current Topics, 826 PRACTISING L. INST. 87, 102 (2010), available at 826 PLI/Lit 87. 
 153. Id.; see also Keitner, supra note 113, at 64 & n.11; Ramsey, supra note 74, at 279. 
 154. See Cynthia R.L. Fairweather, Obstacles To Enforcing International Human Rights 
Law in Domestic Courts, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 119, 120–22 (1998); supra notes 
121–23 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 152, at 102 (discussing Unocal as an example, 
where the court dismissed the Government of Myanmar but kept the corporate defendants in 
the action); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 22–23; Ramsey, supra note 74, at 
279. 
 156. See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
 157. See, e.g., Order, Estate of Albazzaz v. Prince, No. 1:09cv616 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6, 
2010), ECF No. 102 (settling claims against private government contractor Blackwater and 
its founder, Erik Prince); Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release, Wiwa v. Shell 
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However, ATS lawsuits against corporate defendants are not without 
their difficulties for plaintiffs.  These claims are often dismissed on a 
number of procedural grounds.  In Sosa, the Court suggested that the 
plaintiffs might need to exhaust local remedies in particular situations 
before seeking U.S. jurisdiction under the ATS.158  As a result, many 
corporate defendants seek dismissal under the principle of forum non 
conveniens and often see their motions granted.159  Moreover, in light of 
the difficulties in pleading facts regarding a foreign crime, plaintiffs face 
increasing difficulty in meeting the pleading standard recently set forth by 
the Supreme Court.160  Furthermore, as discussed in Unocal, the state 
action requirement greatly limits the susceptibility of corporate defendants 
to suit in cases not involving jus cogens violations.161
Procedural limitations pose a number of obstacles for foreign plaintiffs 
seeking recovery against corporate defendants under the ATS.  However, 
recent cases that more fundamentally question the exercise of jurisdiction 
over a corporation under the ATS pose a far greater danger to plaintiffs.
 
162  
Corporate liability for a violation of the law of nations is largely dependent 
on whether a court employs international or domestic law.163
3.  Differences in Corporate Liability Depending on Whether International 
or Domestic Law Applies 
  The 
following section discusses the divergent outcomes arising from the 
application of these two bodies of law. 
As abstract, artificial beings, corporations are viewed as “judicial 
persons” by the legal system.164
 
Petroleum, N.V., No. 96-cv-8386 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2009), ECF No. 520 (resolving 
allegations that company aided Nigerian military in violating the rights of an indigenous 
group for $11 million); Order, Xiaoning v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 07-02151 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 
2007), ECF No. 115 (settling claims alleging Yahoo! aided and abetted Chinese government 
by providing state with information regarding dissenters). 
  This term reflects the character of a 
corporate entity as fundamentally a creation of the law and only possessing 
 158. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 721 (2004). 
 159. See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1300 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of suit on forum non conveniens grounds); Aguinda v. 
Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002) (dismissing suit by Ecuadorian citizens based 
on forum non conveniens doctrine). 
 160. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(dismissing complaint because allegations did not meet heightened pleading standard set in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)); Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 
3969615, at *35 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) (same). 
 161. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk:  The Emergence of Human 
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 941 
(2004); supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text. 
 162. See infra Part II.B. 
 163. For an extensive analysis of the ways courts apply international and domestic law 
within the context of corporate liability, see infra Part II. 
 164. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, *467; see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 636 (1819). 
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those properties conferred upon it by the law.165
Common law in the United States has long recognized the corporate 
entity as a “legal person.”
  These “judicial persons” 
are granted a varying degree of rights, obligations, and duties depending on 
whether domestic or international law applies. 
166  In New York Central & Hudson River 
Railroad Co. v. United States,167 the Supreme Court first acknowledged 
that the changing nature of society demanded that corporations be held 
accountable, just as individuals are, for illegal conduct.168  In holding that 
corporations are fully liable, the Court rejected the notion that a corporate 
entity could not commit a crime solely because of its organization and 
nature.169  Today, U.S. statutory law often treats corporations and 
individuals similarly.170  Additionally, companies are afforded a patchwork 
of constantly evolving rights171 and responsibilities under U.S. law.172
The place of corporations within the international legal landscape is not 
nearly as clear.  Traditionally, corporate entities were not viewed as 
“subjects” of international law.
 
173  Rather, corporate law was almost 
exclusively a domestic matter.174
An examination of corporate nationality and shareholder rights by the 
ICJ illustrates this traditional viewpoint.  In 1958 and 1962, the Belgian 
government filed suit for reparations from the Spanish government, alleging 
that organs of Spain caused damage to Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Ltd., a Canadian company, and, as a result, injured Belgian 
shareholders.
 
175
 
 165. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636; Asbury Hosp. v. Cass Cnty., 7 N.W.2d 438, 
449–50 (N.D. 1943); see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
  In its decision, the ICJ stated that: 
56, *467. 
 166. See Cook Cnty. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125 (2003) 
(examining sources confirming “the common understanding . . . that corporations were 
‘persons’ in the general enjoyment of the capacity to sue and be sued”); N.Y. Cent. & 
Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495–96 (1909) (recognizing that the 
changed nature of the economy requires that courts hold corporations accountable); 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 667 (noting that corporations possessed the capacity to be 
sued at common law). 
 167. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 168. Id. at 495–96. 
 169. Id. at 492–96. 
 170. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, 
unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the [word] ‘person’ [includes] corporations.”); 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2) (2006) (“The term person means . . . a 
corporation . . . .”); FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011) (“We have no doubt 
that ‘person,’ in a legal setting, often refers to artificial entities.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (Free Speech Clause of First 
Amendment); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) (limited Fourth 
Amendment rights); Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (Due Process 
Clause of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 
U.S. 394 (1886) (Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). 
 172. See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968 (2006); In re Temporomandibular Joint Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 
1495–97 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying the common law standard for aiding and abetting to 
corporations). 
 173. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 161, at 944. 
 174. Id. at 937. 
 175. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 1 (Feb. 5). 
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[I]nternational law has had to recognize the corporate entity as an 
institution created by States in a domain essentially within their domestic 
jurisdiction.  This in turn requires that, whenever legal issues arise 
concerning the rights of States with regard to the treatment of companies 
and shareholders, as to which rights international law has not established 
its own rules, it has to refer to the relevant rules of municipal law.176
The court concluded that international law only authorizes the national state 
of the company alone to bring suit on behalf of shareholders.
 
177  However, 
the court noted that the way international law recognizes corporate activity 
may be changing.  Municipal institutions, such as the corporate entity, 
increasingly cross borders and transform the relations between States.178  
As a result, international law continues to evolve in response to the 
transformation of international economic relations.179  The ICJ suggested 
that perhaps customary international law should have already developed 
rules governing the international activities of corporations.180
Today, a substantial body of international law recognizes the corporate 
entity in some capacity.  Corporations have a number of duties and 
obligations under international law.
 
181  Corporate entities are indirectly 
bound by specific international obligations directly imposed on States.182  
Furthermore, corporations can be held civilly liable for certain violations of 
international environmental law.183
 
 176. Id. ¶ 38. 
  It is also possible for corporations to 
enforce their rights in a variety of international legal fora, including the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunals, and the United Nations Claims 
 177. Id. ¶ 78. 
 178. Id. ¶ 38. 
 179. Id. ¶ 39. 
 180. See id. ¶ 89 (“[I]t may at first sight appear surprising that the evolution of law has 
not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallized on the 
international plane.”). 
 181. See, e.g., Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 
(Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations] (discussing the 
obligation of businesses to respect human dignity); U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development, The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/Misc. 21 (Oct. 1999) (requiring that transnational corporations abide by 
responsible business practices); see also Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 161, at 949–60 
(discussing these various duties of corporations, otherwise known as “soft law” obligations). 
 182. U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations, supra note 181, pmbl. (listing various 
international instruments that indirectly bind corporations). 
 183. See, e.g., Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment art. 2, ¶ 6, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228 (defining person as 
any entity, “whether corporate or not”); International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage art. 1, ¶ 2, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention on Oil 
Pollution] (binding any person, “whether corporate or not”); Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage art. 1(1)(a), May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention] (imposing liability on “any private or public body whether corporate or 
not” for nuclear damage). 
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Commission.184  These treaties may demonstrate that international law 
recognizes the corporate entity in some form.185
Within the context of human rights, the international community 
acknowledges that international law must in some way monitor the 
behavior of corporations.
 
186  In the Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, the United Nations recognized that corporations have the 
obligation to promote, respect, and protect human rights as established by 
international and national laws.187  To ensure compliance with this 
aspiration, the document proposed that corporations establish internal 
compliance regimes and allow periodic monitoring by international 
organizations.188  Additionally, the statement suggested that States establish 
the necessary legal framework for assuring that corporations comply with 
these norms and award the necessary damages to those affected by a 
company’s failure to comply.189
On going debate exists over whether customary international law 
recognizes corporate liability for a violation of the law of nations.
 
190  The 
question of whether corporations can be held civilly liable under the ATS is 
largely dependent on whether a court chooses to apply international or 
domestic law.191  However, Supreme Court precedent gives little indication 
of which body of law courts should draw upon in making this 
determination.192
II.  THE INCREASING CONFUSION OVER WHETHER A CORPORATE 
DEFENDANT CAN BE LIABLE FOR A “VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS” 
  Part II examines the varied approaches that different 
courts employ to address whether a corporation can be liable under the 
ATS. 
The divergent application of Sosa’s principles by lower courts has 
created high levels of uncertainty for ATS litigants.193
 
 184. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 
  Specifically, when 
answering the question of whether corporations can be subject to liability 
under the ATS, courts utilize a variety of approaches that are rooted in 
161, at 947. 
 185. See id. at 948.  For a broad discussion of these treaties and more international 
decisions in favor of corporate liability, see Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human 
Rights:  A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 475–88 (2001). 
 186. See U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations, supra note 181, pmbl. 
 187. Id. ¶ 1. 
 188. Id. ¶¶ 15–16. 
 189. Id. ¶¶ 17–18; see also U.N. Report of the Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on 
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
Promotion of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right To Development, ¶ 87, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (“States 
are required to take appropriate steps to investigate, punish and redress corporate-related 
abuse of the rights of individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction—in short, to 
provide access to remedy.”). 
 190. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 191. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 192. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 193. See supra notes 111–19 and accompanying text. 
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international law, domestic law, or an overlay of both sets of principles.  
The following section, Part II.A, identifies cases where courts have either 
implicitly or expressly held that corporations can violate the law of nations.  
Part II.B addresses the recent jurisprudence of a number of courts finding 
that corporate entities cannot be defendants under the ATS. 
A.  The Different Rationales for Holding Corporations Accountable Under 
the ATS 
Courts frequently rule on ATS cases involving corporate defendants194 or 
impose liability195 on these defendants without specifically addressing 
whether corporate entities can be held liable (precedent sub silentio).196  
Rather, corporate liability is often assumed without any discussion.197  
Additionally, some courts have explicitly stated that they are assuming that 
corporations can be held liable under the ATS.198
 
 194. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174–75, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that jurisdiction over corporate defendants existed for nonconsensual medical 
experimentation on humans because universally accepted norms of customary international 
law prohibited the conduct); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 
2007) (affirming the lower court’s finding that jurisdiction existed over nonfrivolous claims 
asserted against mining corporation for vicarious liability of jus cogens norms), remanded in 
part on other grounds, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
473 F.3d 345, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding the lower court’s denial of oil company’s 
motion to dismiss on political questions grounds); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 
449 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that corporate defendants did not act in concert with the state to 
be liable); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that 
the court had personal jurisdiction over energy companies but that the action must be 
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds); Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 
988, 1012–15 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (holding that allegations of forced labor by multinational 
company did not fall within the meaning well-established under international law); Mujica v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1183 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (allowing claim to 
proceed against oil company and private security firm); supra notes 149–50 and 
accompanying text (discussing Unocal). 
  Although substantial in 
terms of volume, these courts provide no rationale behind their decisions 
and, thus, provide little meaningful insight into the issue of corporate 
 195. See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2008) 
(holding that Cuban nationals were entitled to between fifteen and twenty million dollars 
each in compensatory damages and ten million dollars each in punitive damages from 
corporate defendants for human trafficking and forced labor); see also Judgment in a Civil 
Trial, Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., No. 08-CV-1659 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 6, 2009), ECF No. 48 (jury verdict of $1.5 million in compensatory damages and 
$250,000 in punitive damages against corporate defendant for torture claim). 
 196. Precedent sub silentio refers to cases where issues are passed on in silence, without 
being expressly mentioned. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 109, at 1296. 
 197. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 161 & n.12 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Leval, J., concurring) (collecting cases involving corporate defendants where liability was 
“assumed”). 
 198. See, e.g., Talisman II, 582 F.3d 244, 261 n.12 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We will also assume, 
without deciding, that corporations . . . may be held liable for the violations of customary 
international law . . . .”); Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113–14 (5th Cir. 
1988) (assuming that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the corporate defendant 
because it was “unnecessary to decide” the question). 
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liability.  As a result, substantial disagreement exists over whether these 
cases qualify as binding authority.199
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
 
200 U.S. 
District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York,201 and 
a concurring judge within the Second Circuit,202
1.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
 have expressly concluded 
that ATS liability can properly be imposed upon corporate entities.  In 
doing so, these courts often rely on the decisions of courts where liability 
was assumed to hold that liability is appropriate in the current case. 
The Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit to have explicitly ruled in support 
of corporate liability under the ATS.203  In Romero v. Drummond Co.,204 a 
labor union, its leaders, and relatives of its deceased leaders brought an 
ATS action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama 
against the mining company Drummond.205  The plaintiffs alleged that, 
under the direction of corporate executives in the United States, the 
company hired paramilitaries affiliated with the United Self-Defense Forces 
of Colombia to torture the union leaders.206  On appeal, the defendants 
argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 
ATS did not allow suits against corporations.207
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly exercised 
subject matter jurisdiction over Drummond under the ATS.
 
208  The court 
relied on two arguments in deciding that the ATS permitted suits against 
corporate defendants.  First, the court cited its prior decision in Aldana v. 
Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc.209  In Aldana, the court found that the 
plaintiffs had properly stated a claim under the ATS against a corporate 
defendant.210  The Aldana court simply assumed that a corporate entity 
could be held liable without any discussion of the issue.211  Nonetheless, 
the Eleventh Circuit, in Romero, characterized itself as “bound by that 
precedent.”212
 
 199. Compare In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 58–59 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (listing cases and finding that “the disposition of these cases is inconsistent 
with the assertion that no claim under the ATS can be brought against corporations”), aff’d, 
517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008), with Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124–25 (holding that the fact that the 
court has decided ATS cases involving corporations “does not foreclose consideration of the 
issue”). 
  Next, the Eleventh Circuit briefly addressed the text of the 
 200. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 201. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 58; Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 319 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 202. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 203. See Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 152, at 122. 
 204. 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 205. Id. at 1309. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1314. 
 208. Id. at 1315. 
 209. 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 210. Id. at 1250; see also Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315. 
 211. Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 152, at 122; see also Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1250. 
 212. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315. 
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statute.213  Because the statute provided no express exception for 
corporations, the court concluded that corporations were not immune from 
suit.214
In concluding that corporations could be liable, the Eleventh Circuit 
engaged in no substantive analysis of customary international law.
 
215  
Rather, the court relied upon its silence in past cases and the express text of 
the statute.  The Eleventh Circuit cited favorably to Romero in a subsequent 
ATS case, where the court again rejected defendants’ argument that 
corporations could not be held liable under the statute.216  As such, the 
issue of corporate liability is viewed as a settled question within the 
Eleventh Circuit.217
A number of district courts have also concluded that the ATS applies to 
corporate defendants.  In particular, two district court opinions from the 
Second Circuit—Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. 
(Talisman I)
 
218 and In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation219—
provide the most extensive examination of the question.220  Although these 
cases are no longer binding in light of the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Kiobel, other jurisdictions draw heavily upon these cases in concluding that 
corporations can commit a violation of the law of nations.221  As a result, 
these cases remain highly instructive on the issue that this Note seeks to 
address.222
2.  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
 
Although the Second Circuit decided Filártiga, the first modern ATS 
case, in 1980,223
 
 213. Id. 
 the first case to address the question of corporate liability 
 214. Id. 
 215. Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 152, at 122. 
 216. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 217. Cf. Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 152, at 122. 
 218. 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 219. 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 220. See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615, at *61 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 8, 2010). 
 221. See, e.g., Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 753–54 (D. Md. 2010) 
(discussing Romero, Talisman I, and Agent Orange); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 
F. Supp. 2d 569, 588 (E.D. Va. 2009) (discussing Talisman I and Agent Orange); see also 
Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *61 (“Many other courts have relied almost exclusively on the 
reasoning employed by these two decisions.”). 
 222. Without providing extensive analysis, a number of other district courts also 
expressly reject the argument that a corporation cannot be held liable under the ATS. See, 
e.g., Al-Quraishi, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 753–54 (determining that the law of nations extends to 
corporations based on domestic precedent); XE Servs., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 588 (holding that 
nothing in Sosa may be read to distinguish between private and public actors); Bowoto v. 
Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506, 2006 WL 2455752, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) 
(finding that once “an international norm has been sufficiently well established to reach 
private actors, there is very little reason to differentiate between corporations and 
individuals”). 
 223. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. 
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within the circuit was decided in 2003.224  In Talisman I, a group of 
plaintiffs alleged that Talisman Energy, Inc., a large Canadian energy 
company, participated with the Sudanese government in the ethnic 
cleansing of the non-Muslim Sudanese population within the country’s 
southern oil fields.225  According to the complaint, Talisman aided this 
genocidal policy for the purpose of facilitating exploitative oil activities in 
the region.226  Talisman moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, in part, claiming that a corporation is legally incapable 
of violating the law of nations.227
The Southern District of New York rejected the company’s argument.  
The court held that corporations could be liable for violations of the law of 
nations, “particularly when their actions constitute jus cogens 
violations.”
 
228  In making this determination, the court cited a “considerable 
body” of domestic and international precedent in support of its holding.229
Because the district court decided Talisman I prior to Sosa, the court 
started its review of domestic precedent with Second Circuit decisions.
 
230  
The court offered an extensive review of circuit precedent, beginning with 
the birth of ATS litigation in Filártiga,231 through Kadic’s extension of 
liability to individuals,232 to more recent cases brought against corporate 
defendants.233  The court concluded that Second Circuit precedent indicates 
that imposition of liability on corporations is the norm, not the exception, in 
ATS jurisprudence.234
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that sub silentio precedent 
could not support a finding of corporate liability.
 
235  Because subject matter 
jurisdiction is fundamental in determining whether a court may hear a case, 
it is the duty of any court to consider if jurisdiction is proper even if the 
parties do not raise the issue.236  Therefore, if corporate entities were 
incapable of being subject to jurisdiction, prior courts had the legal duty to 
address the issue sua sponte.237
 
 224. See Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
  By not dismissing prior ATS cases against 
 225. Id. at 296. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 308.  Talisman primarily relied on the opinions of two esteemed international 
legal scholars, James Crawford and Christopher Greenwood. Id.  These scholars submitted 
affidavits examining international law to conclude that a corporate entity cannot be liable. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 309. 
 232. Id. at 309–11. 
 233. Id. at 311–13 (discussing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 234. Id. at 319. 
 235. Id. at 312. 
 236. Id. at 312–13. 
 237. Id.  A court is considered to act sua sponte when it issues a ruling without prompting 
or suggestion by the parties. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 109, at 1560. 
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corporations, the Second Circuit “tacitly acknowledged that subject matter 
jurisdiction lay in that case.”238
The district court then examined the weight of international precedent in 
favor of its conclusion.
 
239  The court rejected Talisman’s argument that 
because the Nuremberg Tribunals (the Tribunals) held individuals and not 
their corporate entities liable following World War II, the Tribunal did not 
consider corporations liable.240  Rather, the court found informative the 
language of the Tribunals, which spoke in terms of corporate liability.241  
This language showed that the Tribunals considered corporations culpable 
and thus formed the basis for the concept of corporate liability for jus 
cogens violations.242  Next, the court examined numerous treaties 
pertaining to the environment, which impose liability directly upon 
corporate entities.243  Because a number of treaties impose liability on 
corporations for unintentional toxic torts, “logic would suggest that they can 
be held liable for intentional torts such as complicity in genocide, slave 
trading, or torture.”244  Lastly, the court noted that international 
organizations, such as the United Nations and the European Union, impose 
various duties on corporate behavior to ensure that human rights are 
respected.245
As a result of the lengthy analysis of domestic and international 
precedent, the court concluded that when the plaintiffs alleged jus cogens 
violations, corporations can be subject to liability.
 
246  The court stated that 
this “result should hardly be surprising” considering that a private 
corporation has no immunity under U.S. or international law, and there is 
no logical reason to provide such an immunity.247
 
 238. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 312. 
  Although the court never 
explicitly discussed what body of law controlled its inquiry, its examination 
 239. Id. at 315–18. 
 240. Id. at 315–16; see also Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues:  The 
Nuremberg Trials’ Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien 
Tort Statute, 71 ALB. L. REV. 321, 344–45 (2008).  Formed as military courts following 
World War II by the London Charter, the U.S. and British Nuremberg Tribunals (the 
Tribunals) prosecuted German corporate executives for the various ways they contributed to 
the atrocities. See Allison Marston Danner, The Nuremberg Industrialist Prosecutions and 
Aggressive War, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 651, 653 (2006); see also Agreement for the Prosecution 
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter] (establishing the Tribunals).  Courts increasingly 
look to the Tribunals for guidance on the scope of corporate liability under the ATS. See 
Skinner, supra, at 326. 
 241. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 316 (discussing United States v. Krupp, Control 
Council No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1945), quoted in Ratner, supra note 185, at 477–78 n.134); see 
Skinner, supra note 240, at 344–45. 
 242. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 316; see Skinner, supra note 240, at 344–45. 
 243. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 316–18 (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 183, 
art. 2(1); Convention on Oil Pollution, supra note 183, art. 3(1), among others). 
 244. Id. at 317. 
 245. Id. at 317–18 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 101). But 
see supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (Sosa rejecting the plaintiff’s reliance on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as evidence). 
 246. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 319. 
 247. Id. 
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of international precedent suggests that the court considered international 
law as governing. 
3.  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
Two years following Talisman I, a second district court within the 
Second Circuit concluded that ATS liability could be imposed on corporate 
entities.  The Eastern District of New York analyzed corporate liability in 
Agent Orange.248  The court dismissed a complaint brought by Vietnamese 
nationals and the Vietnamese Association for Victims of Agent 
Orange/Dioxin against corporations based in the United States for 
violations of international and domestic law.249  Specifically, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the companies manufactured and supplied herbicides to the 
United States and South Vietnam, who then sprayed and spilled the 
chemicals in Vietnam from 1961 to 1975.250  The party sought damages for 
the deaths and exposure to the herbicides of the plaintiffs under the ATS, in 
addition to environmental clean-up costs, abatement, and disgorgement of 
profits.251
In their motion to dismiss, defendants argued that customary 
international law did not extend to corporate behavior.
 
252  Although the 
court recognized that there was “substantial support for this position,”253 it 
held that a corporation was not immune from civil liability based on 
international law.254  First, Judge Jack B. Weinstein rested on general 
principles of fairness and logic in stating there existed no reason why 
corporations should not be held liable to the same extent as individuals 
under the ATS.255
Limiting civil liability to individuals while exonerating the corporation 
directing the individual’s action through its complex operations and 
changing personnel makes little sense in today’s world. . . . Our vital 
private activities are conducted primarily under corporate auspices, only 
corporations have the wherewithal to respond to massive toxic tort suits, 
and changing personnel means that those individuals who acted on behalf 
of the corporation and for its profit are often gone or deceased before they 
or the corporation can be brought to justice.
  The court noted that: 
256
 
 248. 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 
 249. Id. at 15. 
 250. Id. at 27. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 54–55.  
 253. Id. at 55.  The court noted that many of the sources of international law cited by the 
defendants concerned criminal liability. Id. at 57.  However, “limitations on criminal liability 
of corporations do not necessarily apply to civil liability of corporations.” Id. 
 254. Id. at 58. 
 255. See id. at 58–59; see also Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615, 
at *62 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) (characterizing Agent Orange’s argument as based on 
general principles of fairness). 
 256. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 58. 
2011] “MORAL MONSTERS” UNDER THE BED 2887 
According to the court, international law in no way immunizes corporations 
from civil legal actions.257
Next, the court adopted a portion of an amicus brief that addressed the 
weight of precedent in favor of its decision.
 
258  Amici stated that the 
Supreme Court had “acknowledged that corporations can be sued under the 
ATS” in footnote twenty of Sosa.259  Furthermore, the brief cited to a 
number of Second Circuit cases where the court considered claims against 
corporations for breach of international law without expressly addressing 
corporate culpability.260  Amici contended that the disposition of these 
cases was inherently inconsistent with the defendants’ argument that 
corporations were not subject to ATS liability.261  Similar to Romero, the 
court relied on precedent sub silentio to conclude that courts had already 
acknowledged corporate defendants as potentially culpable.262  The court 
also acknowledged that the Talisman I court affirmatively decided the issue 
of corporate liability under the ATS.263  In particular, no court had ever 
presented a policy reason for why corporations should be immune from 
ATS liability, and Judge Weinstein declined to find differently.264
Lastly, the court held that even if domestic law applied, corporate 
defendants could still be sued under the ATS.
 
265  Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court had “made clear that an ATS claim is a federal common law claim 
and it is a bedrock tenet of American law that corporations can be held 
liable for their torts.”266
While Agent Orange recognized that corporations could be liable for a 
violation of the law of nations,
 
267 the opinion provided far less clarity in 
understanding which law governs the question.  According to the court, 
both international and domestic law bolstered its finding.268  Yet the court 
supported its position with few sources of international law.269  Nowhere 
did the court address whether a “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm 
of international law extended liability to corporate entities.270
 
 257. Id. 
  Furthermore, 
within the context of domestic law, the court merely surmised that, as a 
 258. Id.; see Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *64–65 (characterizing this as a “stare decisis-
based argument”).  The court found the amicus brief submitted by Professor Jordan J. Paust 
particularly “learned and compelling.” Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 18.  
 259. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 58; see also Keitner, supra note 113, at 72. 
 260. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 58. 
 261. Id. at 58–59. 
 262. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text. 
 263. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (citing Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 311–
19 (2003)). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id.; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.  
 267. See Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 59. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See generally id. at 55–58 (expressly rejecting a handful of sources of international 
law cited within the defendant’s brief as not granting corporations immunity). 
 270. See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615, at *63 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 8, 2010) (identifying Agent Orange as failing to apply the Sosa standard). 
2888 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
federal common law claim, the ATS binds corporations just as any 
domestic tort would.271
4.  Judge Pierre N. Leval’s Concurrence in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co. 
 
The Second Circuit’s recent opinion in Kiobel offered a substantive 
examination of which body of law should decide corporate ATS liability.272  
Writing separately, Judge Pierre N. Leval reasoned that corporations could 
be held liable for a violation of the law of nations.273  However, because the 
complaint fell short of the pleading standards articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,274 Judge Leval concurred with the majority in 
judgment.275  Although written as a concurrence, this opinion functions 
largely as a dissent due to the divergent choice of law principles that Judge 
Leval applied.276
Judge Leval utilized a complex two-tiered choice of law analysis in his 
concurrence.
 
277  A court should first consider whether any set of facts in an 
ATS case alleges a violation of the law of nations.278  A defendant can only 
be held accountable for a violation if no principle of international law 
exempts that type of defendant.279  If no such exemption exists, a court’s 
second inquiry should focus on the appropriate remedies for a plaintiff 
under international law.280  Because international law allows States to 
impose domestic remedies for civil violations, a judge should ask whether 
domestic law allows a court to grant the plaintiff the requested remedy 
against the defendant.281
In accordance with this approach, Judge Leval began his analysis by 
considering whether the set of facts alleged a violation of international 
law.
 
282  If international law exempted corporations from liability, the court 
could not hold the defendants accountable.283  According to the 
concurrence, corporations are not immune under international law.284
 
 271. See supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text. 
  
However, the Kiobel majority identified an exemption based in part on the 
 272. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).  The 
arguments presented by the majority in this case will be analyzed infra Part II.B.2. 
 273. See id. at 150 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 274. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); see supra note 160 and accompanying text (explaining how 
the pleading standard has placed limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to sue corporate 
entities). 
 275. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 153–54 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 276. See Anderson, supra note 15. 
 277. In Part III.A.2, this Note will further examine the method chosen by Judge Leval and 
ultimately conclude that the approach can be simplified in accordance with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Sosa. 
 278. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 174.  
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 176. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 174, 188. 
 283. Id. at 174. 
 284. Id. at 175. 
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lack of international tribunals exercising jurisdiction over corporations.285  
According to Judge Leval, the absence of tribunals exercising jurisdiction in 
no way implies that international law deems a corporation immune from 
liability.286  Rather, this is a reflection on the type of international 
jurisdiction exercised over private actors.287  Notably, every tribunal to ever 
exercise jurisdiction over private actors has acted within the context of 
criminal liability.288  However, it is widely believed by the international 
community that imposing criminal punishment over a judicial person, like a 
corporate entity, would be incompatible with the objectives of criminal 
law.289  Thus, the absence of tribunals exerting jurisdiction over 
corporations results from the fact that these courts are only empowered to 
exert criminal liability over private actors.290  Judge Leval noted that, if this 
lack of civil liability means that international law immunizes corporations, 
natural persons would be immune from civil liability under the ATS as 
well.291
Although international law exerts jurisdiction solely over private actors 
within the criminal context, it allows States to decide whether to inflict civil 
penalties on these defendants.
 
292  If a State decides to do so, the remedies 
available are also left to that State’s discretion.293  This discretion exists in 
light of the diversity of legal systems across the world and in recognition of 
the near impossibility of reaching State consensus on how to impose civil 
liability.294  According to Judge Leval, a number of multilateral treaties 
protecting human rights exemplify this principle.295  These treaties define 
the general prohibited conduct, but allow each State to devise its own 
system for enforcing the norm.296
 
 285. See id.  The majority in Kiobel disputed Judge Leval’s characterization of its holding 
as “immun[izing]” corporations from an ATS claim. Id. at 120 (majority opinion).  The 
majority maintained this characterization assumed that an international norm existed, rather 
than correctly asking first whether international law extended liability to corporate 
defendants. Id. 
  As such, a court’s second inquiry should 
 286. Id. at 166 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 287. See id. at 166–67. 
 288. Id. at 170–71 (citing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., ¶ 4, 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]; London Charter, supra note 240, 
art. 1). 
 289. Id. at 166–68.  The concurrence described the following objectives of criminal law:  
retribution, incapacitation, specific deterrence, and general deterrence. See id. at 167.  
However, the only punishment that can be inflicted on a corporation is a monetary fine. Id. at 
168. 
 290. See id.; see also supra note 253 (describing Talisman I’s recognition of the 
distinction between civil and criminal liability under international law). 
 291. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 292. Id. at 172–74. 
 293. Id. at 173. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. (discussing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide arts. I, II, V, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277). 
 296. Id.; see also supra notes 184–89 and accompanying text (describing the U.N. Human 
Rights Norms for Corporations, which encourages States to enforce human rights 
domestically). 
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focus on whether the domestic court has provided for such a remedy.297  By 
enacting the ATS, the U.S. Congress empowered courts to adjudicate 
claims by foreign plaintiffs for violations of the law of nations and, thus, 
sanctioned suits against corporate entities.298
Judge Leval rejected the contention that, under Sosa, imposition of 
particular civil remedies must be universally accepted and applied by States 
within their domestic courts.
 
299  Although Sosa required a “norm” to have 
achieved universal acceptance, a norm refers to standards of conduct, not 
the remedies States decide to implement.300  This view is consistent with 
Sosa, where the violation turned on whether the conduct of arbitrarily 
detaining someone violated the law of nations.301  Additionally, opinions 
considering the state action requirement support this contention.302  In Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,303 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit considered whether conduct performed without color of State law 
could be actionable.304  As a result, Sosa’s requirement that a norm enjoy 
universal acceptance does not relate to the remedies that States decide to 
impose domestically.305
Next, Judge Leval concluded that the question of whether a corporation, 
as opposed to an individual, can be liable relates to the remedy and not to 
the corporation’s conduct.
 
306  The conduct of the corporate defendants in 
Kiobel “indisputably does violate the law of nations.”307
 
 297. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 175 (Leval, J., concurring). 
  Judge Leval 
distinguished this from Tel-Oren, where the defendant’s conduct, “because 
 298. See id. 
 299. Id. at 176–78. 
 300. See id.  Much of this discussion mirrors the theories proposed by Professors William 
R. Casto and Chimène I. Keitner, who argue that Sosa directs courts to distinguish between 
conduct-regulating rules and other rules of decision under the ATS. See Casto, supra note 
27, at 638–39 (“The new cause of action envisioned by Sosa is unintelligible unless the well-
established distinction between rights and remedies is kept clearly in mind.”); William R. 
Casto, Regulating the New Privateers of the Twenty-First Century, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 
695 (2006) (finding that the Sosa guidelines “draw a sharp distinction between the norms for 
which a tort remedy is provided and the multitude of other legal issues that arise in tort 
litigation”); Keitner, supra note 113, at 79–81 (distinguishing between “conduct-regulating 
norms” and “ancillary” questions).  Part III.B of this Note will further develop this theory 
within the context of corporate liability and propose that courts utilize this approach in 
understanding choice of law principles. 
 301. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176–78 (Leval, J., concurring); see also supra notes 99–106 and 
accompanying text (laying out Sosa’s examination of international sources to determine 
whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a violation). 
 302. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176–78  (discussing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 
F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)); see also Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 
F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 303. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 304. Id.; see Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 177 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 305. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 178; see also Casto, supra note 300, at 695 (describing “rules of 
decision that are not conduct-regulating norms” as not subject to the Sosa standard). 
 306. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176–78.  In addressing Judge Leval’s argument, the Kiobel 
majority held that corporate liability should be considered akin to accessorial liability, rather 
than a remedial issue. Id. at 147–48 (majority opinion).  Remedies solely refer to what a 
plaintiff may recover under the law. Id. at 147 n.50. 
 307. Id. at 177 (Leval, J., concurring). 
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done by an actor of specified character, [did] not violate the law of 
nations.”308  Instead, the Kiobel defendants would be liable for their 
conduct under the ATS even if an individual undertook that conduct.309  In 
other words, the question of whether a corporate defendant, as opposed to 
an individual, can be held liable does not hinge on the conduct performed 
by the defendant.  Therefore, Sosa’s requirement of a “specific, universal, 
and obligatory” norm should have no bearing on the issue at hand.310
Like the court in Agent Orange, Judge Leval contended that footnote 
twenty of Sosa also supported his position.
 
311  His concurrence rejected the 
corporate defendant’s argument that footnote twenty distinguishes between 
corporate and individual conduct.312  Rather, read in context, the footnote 
concerned the distinction between a private actor and state actor, not the 
distinction between a corporate entity and an individual.313  By placing 
corporate entities and individuals together, the court implied that natural 
persons and judicial persons should be treated “identically” under the 
ATS.314
The patchwork of judicial opinions discussed above employs various 
choice of law principles in concluding that corporations can be liable under 
the ATS.  The Eleventh Circuit rested its decision solely on precedent sub 
silentio and the text of the statute.
 
315  Although never explicitly addressing 
which law governs, the Southern District of New York provided extensive 
review of international authorities and precedent sub silentio in making its 
determination.316  The Eastern District of New York also examined 
international sources in Agent Orange, but suggested that the fact that 
domestic law imposes liability may suffice under the ATS.317  Finally, in 
first looking to international law, Judge Leval’s Kiobel concurrence 
concluded that this body of law allows States to apply their own domestic 
remedies for conduct performed in violation of international law.318
The concluding section of Part II analyzes the recent jurisprudence 
denying that a corporate entity is capable of an ATS violation.  While the 
opinions addressed above employed widely divergent approaches in 
 
 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. See id. 
 311. Id. at 163–65; see also supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text (examining the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York’s reasoning in Agent Orange). 
 312. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 163–64. 
 313. Id. at 165 (“If the violated norm is one that international law applies only against 
States, then ‘a private actor, such as a corporation or an individual,’ who acts 
independently of a State, can have no liability . . . .  [I]f the conduct is of the type classified 
as a violation . . . regardless of whether done by a State or a private actor, then ‘a private 
actor, such as a corporation or an individual,’ has violated the law of nations . . . .” (quoting 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004))); see also Keitner, supra note 113, 
at 72. 
 314. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 165; see also Keitner, supra note 113, at 72. 
 315. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 316. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 317. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 318. See supra Part II.A.4. 
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holding corporations liable, courts reaching the opposite result have 
uniformly based their decisions on international law. 
B.  Courts Holding that Corporations Cannot Be Held Liable Under the 
ATS Based on International Law 
Prior to 2010, no court addressing the question of whether a corporation 
could violate the law of nations had denied the existence of liability.319  
However, within the span of a month, three courts—the Second Circuit,320 
and the U.S. District Courts for the Central District of California321 and 
Southern District of Indiana322
1.  The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
—had foreclosed plaintiffs from asserting an 
ATS claim against any corporation within their jurisdictions. 
Thirteen years following Unocal and the influx of corporate defendants 
into ATS litigation,323 the Central District of California held that courts 
have no jurisdiction over corporate entities.  In Doe v. Nestle, S.A.,324 the 
court dismissed corporate defendants Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Nestle 
USA, and Cargill, Inc. from a complaint alleging that the companies aided 
and abetted the forced labor of Malians working on cocoa fields in Cote 
d’Ivoire.325  Although the court rested its holding on the plaintiffs’ failure 
to plead sufficient facts under Iqbal,326 the court chose to address the 
corporate defendants’ argument that international law does not extend 
liability to corporations.327
The court first examined Sosa and the two opposing concerns that lower 
courts grapple with when applying Sosa’s choice of law principles.
 
328  
Although the Supreme Court observed in Sosa that the First Congress did 
not intend for the ATS to lay dormant, the Supreme Court also expressed 
the need for restraint in recognizing causes of action under the ATS.329  The 
Central District of California found that Sosa’s discussion of law as “‘a 
product of human choice’” weighs in favor of a restrained approach.330  The 
court concluded that Sosa sought to cabin a judge’s discretion by requiring 
that a court look to universally recognized and well-defined international 
legal principles.331  In light of the language of footnote twenty,332
 
 319. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 151. 
 the 
 320. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 111 (majority opinion). 
 321. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010). 
 322. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Ind. 2010); Viera 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:09-cv-0495, 2010 WL 3893791 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010). 
 323. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 324. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615. 
 325. Id. at *1. 
 326. Id. at *31. 
 327. Id. at *57. 
 328. Id. at *57–60. 
 329. Id. at *57–58; see supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.  
 330. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *58 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
729 (2004)); see supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 331. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *58–59. 
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Central District of California held that a court must utilize the same 
restraint in assessing whether a particular type of defendant could be held 
liable.333  In other words, “the correct approach under Sosa is to determine 
whether universal, well-defined international law ‘extends the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given norm to . . . corporation[s].’”334
The court next examined the various lines of reasoning used by courts—
most notably in Agent Orange and Talisman I—that found in favor of 
corporate liability.
 
335  First, the court rejected what it characterized as logic-
based arguments.336  These courts opined that there is no principled basis 
for treating corporations differently than other defendants.337  Yet Sosa 
requires that judges not rely on their own opinion of what is fair or 
logical.338  According to the Central District of California, a court should 
instead consider whether international law actually contains a specific and 
universally recognized norm.339
Nor did the court find that arguments based on judicial or historical 
precedent illustrated a well-accepted norm of international law.
 
340  Despite 
the abundance of case law recognizing corporate liability, none of these 
opinions identified a sufficiently established norm,341 and most did not 
even mention corporate liability.342  Furthermore, this would ignore the 
fundamental principle that issues decided sub silentio should not be 
afforded precedential value.343  Turning to historical precedent,344 the court 
examined the following three sources:  the Supreme Court’s early 
recognition of the crime of piracy,345
 
 332. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20; see also supra notes 
 Blackstone’s commentary on 
64–72 and accompanying text. 
 333. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *59. 
 334. Id. at *59 (alteration in original) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20). 
 335. Id. at *62–71. 
 336. Id. at *62–64 (analyzing Romero, Talisman I, and Agent Orange, among others).  
For discussion of the specific arguments utilized by these courts, see supra notes 213–14 and 
accompanying text (Romero), supra notes 244, 247 and accompanying text (Talisman I), and 
supra notes 254–57 and accompanying text (Agent Orange). 
 337. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *62. 
 338. Id. at *58. But see supra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining that principles 
of fairness are evidence of the existing rules of international law). 
 339. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *64. 
 340. Id. at *65–66. 
 341. Id. (discussing Romero, Talisman I, and Agent Orange, among others).  For 
discussion of the specific arguments utilized by these courts, see supra notes 209–12 and 
accompanying text (Romero), supra notes 234–38 and accompanying text (Talisman I), and 
supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text (Agent Orange). 
 342. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *65–66. 
 343. Id. at *65; see Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (“Questions which merely 
lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be 
considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.”). 
 344. Although the court described these arguments as one of the lines of reasoning 
utilized by other courts, the opinion failed to cite one instance in which a court considered 
these specific sources. See Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *65–66. 
 345. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820) (discussing whether 
piracy can be committed by a legal entity or solely by individuals). 
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corporate crimes,346 and a 1907 Attorney General’s opinion regarding the 
use of the ATS.347  Although the first two sources rejected the concept of 
corporate liability, the Attorney General’s opinion provided some support 
for the view that international law may potentially hold corporations 
liable.348
Previous courts addressing corporate liability under the ATS relied 
extensively on international tribunals and conventions to hold corporate 
defendants accountable.
 
349  Specifically, these courts cited heavily to 
statements made by the Nuremberg Tribunals.350  In Nestle, the court 
characterized as “nothing more than dicta” any “stray references” made by 
the tribunals regarding the possibility of corporate liability.351  Next, the 
court examined the treaties relied upon in Talisman I.352  Although 
Talisman I identified a handful of environmental treaties binding corporate 
behavior, these treaties did not establish an accepted norm within the 
context of human rights abuses.  Furthermore, sources identifying a mere 
indirect effect on or mere possibility of liability did not provide a universal 
and well-defined consensus.353  Again, the court emphasized that these 
international sources did not rise to the high threshold required by Sosa.354
Following a rejection of the sources utilized by previous courts, the 
Central District of California concluded that the minimum requirements of 
Sosa had not been satisfied.
 
355  Therefore, the court held that corporations 
are not subject to ATS liability, and the extent they should be is a matter 
better left for Congress to decide.356
 
 346. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
 
56, *476 (“A corporation cannot commit treason, or 
felony, or other crime, in its corporate capacity:  though its members may, in their distinct 
individual capacities.”). 
 347. See Charles J. Bonaparte, Mexican-Boundary-Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 250, 252–53 (1907) (recommending that a plaintiff use the ATS to remedy the 
harm created by a corporation’s treaty violation). 
 348. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *66; cf. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 
F.3d 111, 162–63 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (arguing that the opinion by the 
Attorney General refutes the view that international law does not recognize corporate 
liability). 
 349. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *66–71. 
 350. Id. at *66–68 (examining the rationales of Agent Orange and Talisman I).  For 
discussion of the specific arguments utilized by these courts, see supra notes 240–42 and 
accompanying text (Talisman I) and supra note 257 and accompanying text (Agent Orange). 
 351. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *68. 
 352. Id. at *68–71; see supra notes 239–45 and accompanying text (analyzing 
Talisman I’s reliance on international treaties and conventions). 
 353. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *69–70. 
 354. Id.  In rejecting these sources, the court identified the statute creating the 
International Criminal Court as a compelling argument against treating corporate liability as 
actionable under international law. Id. at *70–71 (discussing ICC Statute, supra note 288, 
art. 25(1)).  Specifically, the drafters of the statute were unable to reach a consensus on 
whether corporations should be held responsible for human rights abuses. Id. 
 355. Id. at *74. 
 356. Id. 
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2.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Less than ten days following Nestle, a second court issued a decision 
holding that a corporation cannot violate the ATS.357  In Kiobel, the Second 
Circuit for the first time decided the question of whether the ATS extends to 
actions against corporations.358  Residents of Nigeria alleged that two 
corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government’s violent 
suppression of an activist group opposed to their oil exploration 
activities.359  The Nigerians brought ATS claims in the Southern District of 
New York for “aiding and abetting (1) extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes 
against humanity; (3) torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; 
(4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violation of the rights to life, liberty, 
security, and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction.”360  
In September 2006, the district court dismissed a number of the claims 
because they were not sufficiently defined by international law.361  The 
court allowed the remaining claims to move forward, but certified the entire 
order for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit.362
On appeal, the Second Circuit described the issue of whether the ATS 
extends liability to judicial persons, such as corporate entities, as a question 
“lurking in [its] ATS jurisprudence.”
 
363  Although the court had decided 
ATS cases involving corporations previously, the Second Circuit did not 
consider itself bound when a later case raised a jurisdictional issue that had 
only been decided sub silentio.364  Therefore, the Second Circuit rejected 
the argument that the cases, in any way, foreclosed consideration of this 
“lurking” question.365
As a preliminary matter, Judge José A. Cabranes, writing for the 
majority, analyzed which body of law controlled the type of perpetrator 
potentially liable under the ATS.
 
366  First, the court noted that international 
law is not silent on the subjects of international law nor does it leave this 
question to individual States to determine.367
 
 357. Although the Kiobel court acknowledged the decision in Nestle, it did not examine 
the Central District of California’s opinion. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 
F.3d 111, 117 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010).  This is likely because the Second Circuit had, in large 
part, drafted the lengthy Kiobel opinion prior to the issuance of Nestle. See id at 151 n.* 
(Leval, J., concurring). 
  This fact is particularly 
 358. Id. at 117 (majority opinion).  One judge in the circuit previously expressed the view 
that corporations were not subject to ATS liability on the basis of customary international 
law. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 321–26 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Since this dissenting opinion was 
published, a number of corporations moved for dismissal based on this viewpoint. Kiobel, 
621 F.3d at 161 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 359. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123 (majority opinion). 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at 124. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. at 117. 
 364. Id. at 124–25 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974)). 
 365. See id. 
 366. Id. at 125–31. 
 367. Id. at 126–27. 
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evident from the Nuremberg Tribunals’ explicit recognition of individual 
liability.368  The Tribunals specifically rejected the argument that 
international law was solely concerned with the actions of States and 
declared that individuals could also be punished under international law.369  
This discussion implied that international law had the ability to recognize 
corporate liability, as it had previously done with individual liability.370
Next, the court examined Sosa and precedent interpreting and applying 
the Supreme Court’s Sosa reasoning.
 
371  According to the court, footnote 
twenty and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Sosa left no question that a 
court must look to international law to determine whether jurisdiction exists 
over a particular ATS defendant.372  This interpretation of Sosa is 
consistent with three decades of Second Circuit precedent.373  It had been 
the practice of the court, starting with Filártiga, to look to international law 
to determine whether a state official committed a violation.374  
Additionally, in Kadic, the court looked to international law to determine 
whether a private actor could be liable.375  Following Sosa, the court 
considered footnote twenty as requiring it to resort to international law to 
determine whether aiders and abettors could violate the law of nations.376  
The court found “no principled basis for treating the question of corporate 
liability differently.”377  As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that 
international law, Sosa, and circuit precedent required application of 
customary international law.378
The court next turned to whether the sources of international law 
demonstrate that corporate liability had obtained the status of a “specific, 
universal, and obligatory” norm in international law.
 
379
 
 368. Id. 
  In reviewing the 
decisions of international tribunals, the court concluded that no tribunal had 
ever held a corporation liable for violation of customary international 
 369. Id. 
 370. See id. 
 371. Id. at 127–31. 
 372. See id. at 127–28; see supra notes 125–30 and accompanying text. 
 373. Id. at 131. 
 374. Id. at 128. 
 375. Id. (citing Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 376. Id. at 128–29 (citing Talisman II, 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009)).  The court 
also discussed Judge Robert Allen Katzmann’s separate opinion in Khulumani v. Barclay 
National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring), as 
requiring the court to consider international law under the ATS because, “‘[u]nder the [ATS] 
the relevant norm is provided not by domestic statute but by the law of nations, and that law 
extends responsibility for the violations of its norms to aiders and abettors.’” Kiobel, 621 
F.3d at 130 (alternation in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 282 
(Katzmann, J., concurring)).  However, in Judge Katzmann’s dissent from the denial of 
rehearing en banc, he described his position in Khulumani as consistent with Judge Leval’s 
determination that corporations can be held accountable under the ATS. See Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2011 WL 338151, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 
2011) (en banc) (Katzmann, J., dissenting). 
 377. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130. 
 378. Id. at 130–31. 
 379. Id. at 131–45. 
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law.380  Specifically, the Nuremberg Tribunals purposely declined to hold 
the corporations involved liable.  Rather, the Tribunals “expressly defined 
liability under the law of nations as liability that could not be divorced from 
individual moral responsibility.”381  Additionally, the court found 
significant that the drafters of the charters establishing both the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia382 and the International 
Criminal Court383 expressly rejected proposals to include judicial persons 
within the jurisdiction of the courts.384
The Second Circuit’s examination of treaty-based obligations also failed 
to demonstrate a well-established norm of customary international law in 
favor of corporate liability.
 
385  The court rejected Talisman I’s reliance on 
treaties not ratified by the United States, many of which had not been 
ratified by the States most affected by the terms of the treaty.386  Because 
only universally recognized treaties may be treated as evidence of 
customary international law,387 the court found these treaties insufficient to 
demonstrate a norm of corporate liability.388  Additionally, the few treaties 
that were ratified and universally recognized by States had little influence 
within the context of human rights law.389  These treaties could not be said 
to crystallize an emerging general rule of customary international law 
beyond their limited subject matters.390  Lastly, the court rejected these 
treaties as lacking a “fundamentally norm creating character” and thus 
failing to demonstrate a norm of customary international law.391
The court identified the submissions of two publicists, Professor James 
Crawford and then-Professor Christopher Greenwood, as further supporting 
its holding.
 
392
 
 380. Id. at 132.  In Judge Leval’s concurrence, he contended that the majority’s argument 
depended on the practice of international criminal tribunals. Id. at 166–70 (Leval, J., 
concurring).  For a discussion on the effect that this difference between criminal and civil 
law has on corporate liability under international law, see supra notes 288–91 and 
accompanying text. 
  Although many scholars favor imposing liability on 
corporations under the ATS, even these individuals acknowledge that no 
 381. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135 (majority opinion). 
 382. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 383. ICC Statute, supra note 288, art. 25(1). 
 384. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136–37. 
 385. Id. at 137–41. 
 386. Id. at 138. 
 387. See supra text accompanying notes 90–92 (discussing the relevance of treaties as 
customary international law). 
 388. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138–41. 
 389. Id. at 139.  The court characterized these agreements as “specialized treaties.” Id. 
 390. Id.  Even if these treaties could be viewed as crystallizing an international norm, the 
court argued that the express rejection of corporate liability within the context of human 
rights treaties would make doing so inappropriate. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at 142–44.  Principles of international law allow courts to consider the works of 
publicists, such as professors and jurists, to be evidence of customary international law. See 
supra note 94 and accompanying text.  In Talisman I, the court considered affidavits 
submitted by these two publicists and ultimately rejected their conclusions. See supra notes 
227–28 and accompanying text. 
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international body has yet imposed criminal liability on a corporate 
entity.393
From this extensive review of international tribunals, international 
treaties, and works of publicists, the Second Circuit concluded that the 
concept of corporate liability had not yet ripened into a rule of customary 
international law.
 
394  Subject matter jurisdiction over claims against 
corporations can only be attained by universal acceptance of corporate 
liability within the international community, which for the time being, has 
yet to be established.395  However, the court emphasized that its opinion in 
no way foreclosed suits against individual corporate officers, actions 
against corporations under other bodies of law, or the ability of Congress to 
take action.396
Following the Kiobel decision, the plaintiffs petitioned the panel for 
rehearing.
 
397  On February 4, 2011, the panel denied plaintiffs’ request for 
rehearing in a 2–1 vote.398  Judge Dennis G. Jacobs filed a concurring 
opinion that described the various policy considerations supporting the 
majority’s decision.399  First, Judge Jacobs argued that Judge Leval’s 
opinion failed to acknowledge that other nations have an interest in the 
remedies afforded under U.S. law.400  For example, while it is universally 
accepted that piracy is in violation of international law, a country still may 
not extradite that individual in light of that country’s opposition to capital 
punishment in the United States.401  Second, Judge Jacobs described the 
majority’s holding as promoting international comity.402  Cases brought 
against foreign companies cause international rivalries and grievances.403  
According to Judge Jacobs, this outcome contradicts the universal 
consensus at the foundation of customary international law.404  Third, 
Kiobel will have the practical benefit of preventing plaintiffs from using the 
ATS “to extort settlements” from corporations.405
 
 393. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 142–44.  In Judge Leval’s concurrence, he explained that these 
affidavits were prepared in response to a request for further briefing on what countries or 
international tribunals have held corporations liable for a violation of the law of nations. Id. 
at 182 (Leval, J., concurring).  However, the absence of such judgments does not bar a 
domestic court from imposing liability. See supra notes 292–98 and accompanying text. 
  For these reasons, Judge 
 394. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149 (majority opinion). 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. at 122. 
 397. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2011 WL 
338048, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011). 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. (Jacobs, J., concurring in the denial of panel rehearing); see also Second Circuit 
Denies Rehearing in Kiobel:  Confirms that the Circuit Does Not Recognize Corporate 
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, MILBANK LITIGATION 2 (2011), 
http://www.milbank.com/NR/rdonlyres/9ED14DF9-61E3-4ECD-A18C-27C26790ADE0/0/
021011Kiobel_En_Banc_Litigation_Client_Alert.pdf. 
 400. Kiobel, 2011 WL 338048, at *1. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. at *2–3. 
 403. Id. at *2. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at *3–4. 
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Jacobs found the Kiobel opinion to be a “matter of great importance” and 
rightly decided.406
Following Kiobel, an active judge and a senior judge of the Second 
Circuit also requested a poll on whether to rehear the case en banc.
 
407  On 
the same day that the panel denied rehearing, the active judges of the 
Second Circuit divided 5–5 as to whether to proceed with an en banc 
rehearing.408  Because no majority favored en banc review, the request for 
rehearing was denied.409
3.  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana 
 
Thirteen days following the decision in Kiobel, the Southern District of 
Indiana, in Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co.,410 fully adopted the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning.411  Brazilian residents filed an ATS claim against six U.S. 
corporations for injuries suffered from pollution emanating from a number 
of manufacturing facilities located in two Brazilian cities.412  Although the 
court opined in dicta that the allegations of environmental pollution did not 
constitute an actionable ATS violation,413 the court primarily rested its 
holding on the Second Circuit’s assertion that “the ATS cannot provide 
federal court jurisdiction over claims based on voluntary actions taken by a 
corporation.”414
Within a week of Viera, a second judge within the Southern District of 
Indiana dismissed an ATS case based on the Kiobel reasoning.  In Flomo v. 
Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,
 
415 a group of Liberian children filed a 
complaint against Firestone Natural Rubber Co. for its Liberian subsidiary’s 
use of forced child labor.416  While the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment was under review, the Second Circuit handed down Kiobel.417
 
 406. Id. at *4.  Judge Leval dissented from the denial of rehearing and described Judge 
Jacobs’s opinion as “reveal[ing] an intense, multi-faceted policy agenda that underlies the 
majority’s undertaking to exempt corporations from the law of nations.” Id. at *4 (Leval, J., 
dissenting).  While Judge Leval did not find all of the policy considerations to be frivolous, 
he did not believe it was the role of the courts to make foreign and domestic policy. Id.  
Additionally, he viewed most of Judge Jacobs’s grievances as directed at ATS jurisdiction 
generally and having no bearing on the specific issue of corporate liability. Id. 
  
After requesting supplemental briefing, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson 
concluded that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
 407. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2011 WL 
338151, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011) (en banc). 
 408. See id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting). 
 409. Id. 
 410. No. 1:09-cv-0495, 2010 WL 3893791 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010). 
 411. See id. at *2 (finding the “reasoning of the Second Circuit persuasive”). 
 412. Id. at *1. 
 413. Id. at *2–3. 
 414. See id. at *2. 
 415. 744 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
 416. Id. at 812. 
 417. Id. 
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plaintiffs’ claims.418  However, the court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants in light of the Kiobel reasoning.419
The court first considered plaintiffs’ contention that federal law 
automatically controlled the scope of a corporation’s liability under the 
ATS.
 
420  After examining footnote twenty, the court held that such an 
argument is against the plain language of Sosa.421
Next, the court asked whether international law directed domestic courts 
to apply federal common law.
 
422  The court found persuasive the majority’s 
reasoning in Kiobel that corporate liability was not proper “until 
international law . . . affirmatively approves the doctrine.”423  Judge 
Magnus-Stinson found three arguments put forth by the Kiobel majority 
particularly compelling.  First, there existed a lack of consensus regarding 
the applicability of corporate liability under international law.424  To 
discount such fact would run counter to internationally accepted norms by 
allowing a court to punish a company, rather than merely compensate an 
injured party.425  Second, Congress expressly limited complaints under the 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA)426 to those against 
individuals.427  The TVPA was intended to codify the classic ATS claim of 
torture performed by a State.428  Because of this, the court determined that 
the decision to limit the scope of this statute provided the court with 
congressional guidance on the question of corporate liability.429  Third, 
there exists no availability of civil corporate liability for violations of the 
law of nations outside of the ATS or for American citizens.430  In light of 
this, the court held that recognizing corporate liability would increase forum 
shopping and result in disparate treatment of citizens and foreign 
plaintiffs.431
Therefore, the Southern District of Indiana held that no norm of 
customary international law held corporations accountable.
 
432
 
 418. Id. at 812–13.  Specifically, the court noted that because the question of corporate 
liability was not definitely resolved, the court could not find the claims to be frivolous so as 
to deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 813. 
  Because 
 419. See id. at 814–16. 
 420. See id. at 815–16. 
 421. Id. 
 422. See id. at 816–18. 
 423. Id. at 816. 
 424. Id. at 816–17; see supra notes 371–93 and accompanying text. 
 425. Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 817. For a discussion of the appropriate objectives of 
international criminal law, see supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text. 
 426. Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
note (2006)). 
 427. Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 817.  While Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson found this 
argument particularly compelling, the Kiobel majority only mentioned it briefly in a 
footnote. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 122 n.23 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 428. Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 817. 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. at 818. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Id. 
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plaintiffs failed to establish a legally cognizable claim, the court entered 
summary judgment for the defendant.433
The Northern District of California, Second Circuit, and Southern 
District of Indiana uniformly applied international law to analyze whether a 
corporation can be liable for an ATS violation.  Ultimately, these courts 
concluded that no norm of international law held corporations accountable 
and thus jurisdiction could not be exerted over the category of 
defendants.
 
434
III.  A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES 
AFTER KIOBEL 
 
The conflicting outcomes analyzed in Part II resulted almost entirely 
from the courts’ initial decisions to apply either domestic or international 
law.  However, the uncertainty regarding which body of law governs is not 
limited to the context of corporate liability, but is part of a more 
encompassing inconsistency across circuits when confronting any novel 
ATS issue.435  For example, prior to Kiobel, the muddled state of aiding and 
abetting liability caused frustration among scholars and persistent 
uncertainty for litigants.436
The next part of this Note advocates for the fashioning of a new 
framework that provides a broad rule to guide all choice of law decisions 
made within the scope of the ATS.  Part III.A addresses the delinquencies 
inherent in the alternative approaches taken by courts in both allowing and 
denying corporate ATS liability in an effort to discern the appropriate 
choice of law principles.  Part III.B expounds upon the works of Professors 
William R. Casto and Chimène I. Keitner to argue that international law 
solely controls the inquiry of what constitutes a violation of the law of 
nations.  All other issues, including whether corporate entities can be liable 
under the ATS, are to be governed by U.S. federal common law. 
  A framework to guide choice of law decisions 
would not only add clarity to the question of corporate liability, but would 
also relieve the enduring confusion with ATS choice of law principles. 
A.  The Significant Shortcomings of the Current Approaches 
Despite a number of opportunities to add clarity to this issue, the 
overwhelming number of courts decline to address the question.437
 
 433. Id. 
  At first 
blush, these opinions appear to imply that corporate liability is undoubtedly 
 434. See supra notes 355–56 and accompanying text (Nestle); supra notes 394–96 and 
accompanying text (Kiobel); supra notes 410–14 and accompanying text (Viera); supra 
notes 432–33 and accompanying text (Flomo). 
 435. See, e.g., supra note 113 and accompanying text (confusion regarding how far a 
norm extends); supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text (varied application of laws to 
define the elements of aiding and abetting liability); supra note 117 and accompanying text 
(questions regarding which international sources should be considered). 
 436. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 437. See supra notes 194–99 and accompanying text. 
2902 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
appropriate.438  However, even disregarding their debatable precedential 
weight,439
1.  The Failure To Understand “Norms” as “Standards of Conduct” 
 these courts make no attempt to identify the correct choice of law 
principles.  Therefore, this Note will not consider precedent sub silentio 
informative on the question of what body of law should govern whether 
corporations can be held liable.  Although deeply flawed, the handful of 
opinions that do directly address the issue provide some insight.  This 
section assesses what value, if any, the opinions examined in Part II of this 
Note have added to the issue. 
Turning first to cases denying the liability of corporate defendants, these 
opinions all suffer from one critical flaw.  The Second Circuit and Central 
District of California assumed that the standard for defining what 
constitutes a violation of a “specific, universal, and obligatory norm” must 
somehow also control the definition for who can commit a violation.440  
Judge Leval’s Kiobel concurrence highlighted the confusion underlying the 
approach taken by the Kiobel majority and other courts:  the Supreme Court 
intended the Sosa standard solely to govern the question of whether a 
defendant’s conduct violated international law.441  Sosa’s interpretation of 
the ATS, and subsequent courts’ reliance on Sosa, demonstrate that a 
“norm” solely relates to a defendant’s conduct.442
A “norm” relates to standards of conduct when viewed in the context of 
the original understanding of the ATS.
 
443  According to the Supreme Court 
in Sosa, it is generally understood that the First Congress enacted the ATS 
with a narrow set of offenses in mind—cases “threatening serious 
consequences in international affairs” and still demanding an individual 
judicial remedy.444  Specifically, Sosa identified infringements of 
ambassadorial rights, piracy claims, and violations of safe conduct as 
falling within this limited category.445  These examples hinged on the 
international character implicated by the conduct.446
 
 438. For use of precedent sub silentio as an argument in favor of recognizing corporate 
liability, see supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text (Romero), supra notes 234–38 and 
accompanying text (Talisman I), and supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text (Agent 
Orange). 
  Therefore, when 
 439. For an understanding of why these opinions should not be regarded as binding 
precedent, see supra notes 341–43 and accompanying text (Nestle) and supra notes 363–65 
and accompanying text (Kiobel). 
 440. See supra notes 328–34 and accompanying text (Nestle); 366–78 and accompanying 
text (Kiobel). 
 441. See supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text. 
 442. See supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text. 
 443. See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 49–56 and 
accompanying text (describing Sosa’s examination of the motives behind the First 
Congress’s enactment of the ATS). 
 444. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004); see also supra notes 50–52 and 
accompanying text. 
 445. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 446. See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 53–57 and 
accompanying text. 
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comparing any claim based on the present-day law of nations to these 
offenses, Sosa merely required that the conduct be defined with the same 
level of specificity and universal acceptance as the conduct troubling the 
First Congress.447
Sosa’s application of the standard to Alvarez-Machain’s claim of a 
modern day violation further illustrates the Court’s focus on a norm as 
conduct.
 
448  The Court exclusively questioned whether Sosa’s conduct—
arbitrarily detaining Alvarez-Machain—violated a universally recognized 
norm.449  In finding for Sosa, the Court again described the issue solely in 
terms of conduct:  Alvarez-Machain failed to demonstrate that “a single 
illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to 
lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment” violated customary 
international law.450  The Court never indicated that the same standard 
should govern who could be liable for such conduct.451
Cases applying this standard fully support the conclusion that Sosa 
defined a “norm” as a standard of conduct.
 
452  In cases brought against 
private individuals, courts often question whether a norm of international 
law can hold private actors liable for the specific conduct at issue.453  In 
Kadic, the Second Circuit undoubtedly considered the identity of the 
perpetrator as a public or private actor.454  However, the court solely 
distinguished between the two categories of actors to determine whether the 
conduct at issue was of “universal concern.”455  This is exactly the 
distinction the Supreme Court recognized as potentially significant in 
footnote twenty.456  While footnote twenty asked whether international law 
extended to the perpetrator being sued, the Supreme Court was concerned 
with whether the conduct of a private actor could violate the law of 
nations.457  In other words, certain conduct performed under “color of state 
law” is more likely to meet the Sosa standard than conduct performed by a 
private actor.458  Once the Second Circuit in Kadic determined that the 
private actor’s conduct violated a well-established and universally 
recognized norm, the defendant’s identity as a private individual had little 
bearing on his liability.459
 
 447. See supra notes 
 
299–300 and accompanying text; see also supra note 72 and 
accompanying text. 
 448. See supra note 301 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 100–06 and 
accompanying text. 
 449. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text. 
 450. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004). 
 451. See supra note 301 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 100–06 and 
accompanying text (discussing Sosa’s examination of sources of international law). 
 452. See supra notes 302–05 and accompanying text. 
 453. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text (discussing Unocal and Kadic’s 
holding on the state action requirement). 
 454. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
 455. See supra notes 144–47, 150 and accompanying text. 
 456. See supra notes 258–59, 311–14 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 125–
30 and accompanying text (describing footnote twenty in Sosa). 
 457. See supra notes 311–14 and accompanying text. 
 458. See supra notes 302–05 and accompanying text. 
 459. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, although still an open question, courts often apply the Sosa 
standard to determine the elements of aiding and abetting liability.460  In 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman II),461 
the Second Circuit looked to international law to find a well-established and 
universally recognized standard for accessorial liability.462  Again, this 
discussion focused solely on the conduct of the defendant—whether 
Talisman purposefully assisted in the ethnic cleansing of the Sudanese 
population—and not on any separate attribute possessed by the 
defendant.463
Sosa solely required that standards of conduct be well-established and 
universally recognized within international law to form the basis of an ATS 
claim.
 
464  In employing this approach to determine whether a corporate 
entity can be liable under the ATS, the Second Circuit, Central District of 
California, and Southern District of Indiana failed to make this critical 
distinction.465
2.  The Misapplication of International Law to “Remedial Questions” 
 
Courts holding that corporate entities are proper ATS defendants 
correctly decline to apply the Sosa standard to the issue of who can be 
liable under the ATS.466  However, these opinions are also not without their 
shortcomings.  Judge Leval’s Kiobel concurrence began by questioning 
whether “any set of facts” violates international law.467  Yet, this opinion 
offered no clear justification for doing so.  Although Judge Leval 
recognized that federal common law provides the source of law for 
remedial questions, he based this finding strictly on principles stemming 
from international law.468  Specifically, Judge Leval opined that there exists 
a principle of international law that allows States to fashion their own 
domestic remedies for civil liability.469  Only because of this principle did 
Judge Leval find it appropriate to turn back to federal common law for a 
remedy against corporate defendants.470
 
 460. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
  Although Judge Leval’s Kiobel 
concurrence ultimately applied the correct body of law—federal common 
law—his opinion failed to recognize that Sosa allows courts to apply 
domestic law directly to remedial questions. 
 461. 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 462. Id. at 258–59. 
 463. See generally id. 
 464. See supra notes 443–47 and accompanying text. 
 465. See supra notes 328–34 and accompanying text (Nestle); supra notes 366–79 and 
accompanying text (Kiobel); supra notes 410–14 and accompanying text (Viera); supra 
notes 420–21 and accompanying text (Flomo). 
 466. See supra notes 208–15 and accompanying text (Romero); supra notes 268–70 and 
accompanying text (Agent Orange); supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text (Kiobel 
(Leval, J., concurring)). 
 467. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring); see supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
 468. See supra notes 292–96 and accompanying text. 
 469. See supra notes 292–97 and accompanying text. 
 470. See supra notes 293–98 and accompanying text. 
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In Sosa, the Supreme Court made clear that federal common law still 
plays a significant role in adjudication of ATS cases.  While the Court 
denied that the ATS created a new cause of action, it recognized that the 
ATS granted jurisdiction to a limited number of claims by foreign 
plaintiffs.471  As discussed above, a judge must consider international law 
to determine whether a defendant has violated a particular standard of 
conduct and, thus, is entitled to jurisdiction.472  A defendant’s conduct must 
“violate [a] norm of customary international law so well defined as to 
support the creation of a federal remedy.”473  In other words, once this 
threshold has been met, federal common law provides the remedy.474
While “remedies” are often viewed as the type of recovery available to a 
plaintiff,
 
475 used within the context of the ATS, the term “remedies” 
encompasses a far broader meaning.  As described by the Court in Sosa, the 
“remedies” flowing from domestic law refer to the creation of the cause of 
action.476  Here, Professor Casto’s comparison to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions 
provides a useful illustration.477  Like the ATS, § 1983 authorizes creation 
of a remedy for violations of standards of conduct.  The U.S. Constitution 
provides these standards for § 1983 actions.478  The rights in the 
Constitution, like the norms stemming from international law, provide the 
means of identifying an actionable violation.479  However, once these 
violations are identified, a court has the discretion to adjudicate both types 
of claims under federal common law.480
Part III.A identified two significant flaws in the reasoning of courts 
considering the issue of corporate liability.  First, courts denying the 
liability of corporations mechanically apply the Sosa standard without any 
justification for doing so.  Second, courts holding corporations accountable 
fail to recognize that Sosa allows courts to apply federal common law to 
remedial questions regardless of the contours of international law.  From 
these principles, the remaining section constructs a workable framework for 
courts to utilize when choosing the correct law in future ATS cases. 
  While this comparison is 
undoubtedly imperfect, it serves as a useful means for understanding the 
interaction between international law, which governs the norms violated by 
a defendant, and domestic law, which provides plaintiffs with a remedy for 
such a violation. 
 
 471. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 472. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 473. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004). 
 474. See Casto, supra note 27, at 638–44; Casto, supra note 300, at 694; Keitner, supra 
note 113, at 81; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 475. See supra note 306 (discussing the Second Circuit’s argument that remedies only 
relate to what a plaintiff may recover). 
 476. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 477. See Casto, supra note 27, at 639–40. 
 478. Id. at 640. 
 479. Id.  Specifically, § 1983 authorizes a federal court to entertain claims by a plaintiff 
who alleges that a state official deprived him or her of “any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 480. Casto, supra note 27, at 640. 
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B.  A Framework Based on the Distinction Between “Standards of 
Conduct” and “Remedies” 
The escalating conflict among courts over whether corporate entities may 
be held liable under the ATS stems largely from a failure to fully 
comprehend the relationship between standards of conduct and remedies.481  
Professors Casto and Keitner describe a coherent way for courts to 
distinguish between these two issues.482  For the most part, this approach 
has only been advocated within the context of aiding and abetting 
liability.483
According to these scholars, there exist two categories of issues arising 
under the ATS.  First, a court may be presented with the question of 
whether the defendant violated a “‘conduct-regulating norm[].’”
  However, in light of Kiobel, this framework provides a 
valuable approach for future courts faced with the question of whether they 
may impose ATS liability on a corporation.  Additionally, if adopted by 
courts, this framework would not only help resolve the persistent questions 
surrounding the ATS but also act as a guide for the range of issues likely to 
arise in future ATS cases. 
484  This 
category of issues demands substantive inquiry into the nature of a 
defendant’s behavior.  Like the issues examined in Part I.B of this Note, 
“conduct-regulating norms” involve determining what constitutes a 
violation of the law of nations.  In accordance with Sosa, these norms must 
be examined by resorting to principles of international law.485  Specifically, 
when considering a “conduct-regulating norm” a judge must ask whether 
the defendant’s conduct violated a “specific, universal, and obligatory” 
international norm.486
Because federal common law provides the source of the remedy in ATS 
litigation, there exists a second category of issues characterized as 
“ancillary” questions.
 
487  These tort remedies are a matter of “pure 
domestic law.”488
 
 481. See supra Part III.A. 
  While these questions have previously been 
 482. See generally Casto, supra note 27; Casto, supra note 300; Keitner, supra note 113. 
 483. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 284–86 (2d Cir. 
2007) (Hall, J., concurring) (arguing that accessorial liability is not a rule of primary liability 
and consulting federal common law); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 963 (9th Cir. 
2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (characterizing aiding and abetting liability as an ancillary 
question and applying domestic law), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Keitner, supra note 113, at 74–83 (arguing that aiding and abetting liability is a 
question of conduct and applying international law); Charles Ainscough, Note, Choice of 
Law and Accomplice Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 588, 
596 (2010) (contending that accomplice liability regulates conduct and arguing for 
application of international law). 
 484. Keitner, supra note 113, at 80–81 (quoting Casto, supra note 300, at 695). 
 485. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 486. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 487. See Keitner, supra note 113, at 80–81; see also Casto, supra note 27, at 639; Casto, 
supra note 300, at 695. 
 488. See Casto, supra note 27, at 644. 
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characterized as matters of practice and procedure,489 they more broadly 
include all other issues which, whether substantive or not, do not bear on 
the defendant’s conduct.490
Under this framework, the question of who can be liable for violating the 
ATS hinges on whether a perpetrator’s identity in any way relates to that 
perpetrator’s conduct.  If not, this likely should be classified as an 
“ancillary” issue and be governed by domestic law.
  It is from this understanding that these scholars 
argue that any issue arising under the ATS can be addressed. 
491  However, if the 
identity of a corporation, as a judicial entity or otherwise, sheds light on the 
illegality of that corporation’s conduct, it may be relevant to a “conduct-
regulating norm.”492  As demonstrated in Kadic and Talisman II, a 
defendant’s identity as a private actor or aider and abettor may factor into 
the consideration of whether a corporation’s conduct violated international 
law.493  In these circumstances, it is proper for the court to consider the 
Sosa standard as guiding its focus.494
Yet the identity of a corporation as a “judicial entity” in no way affects a 
court’s analysis of the corporation’s conduct.
 
495  The courts that denied the 
liability of corporations failed to contend that the conduct performed by the 
corporate defendants did not violate a “specific, universal, and obligatory” 
norm of international law.496  The conduct by the defendants in Kiobel 
undoubtedly violated the law of nations.497  Had this conduct been 
performed by a private actor, there would be little reason not to hold that 
actor accountable.498  The court, however, refused to hold the defendant 
liable for its conduct solely on account of its existence as a corporate 
entity.499
Courts holding corporations accountable have in some way articulated 
this argument.  In Romero, Talisman I, and Agent Orange, the courts 
continually emphasized that no reason existed for treating corporations 
differently than any other private actor.
  As a result, there existed no principled reason for treating the 
question of corporate liability as anything other than a remedial issue 
governed by the long-established practice of treating corporations as any 
other person under federal common law. 
500
 
 489. See Keitner, supra note 
  However, these courts failed to 
link the principle to a larger understanding of the difference between 
113, at 81 & n.93 (citing Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 
932, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 
F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 490. See Casto, supra note 27, at 642–43; see also supra Part III.A.2. 
 491. See supra notes 487–90 and accompanying text. 
 492. See supra notes 484–86 and accompanying text. 
 493. See supra notes 452–63 and accompanying text. 
 494. See supra notes 452–59 and accompanying text. 
 495. See supra notes 306–10 and accompanying text. 
 496. See supra Part II.B. 
 497. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
 498. See supra notes 306–10 and accompanying text. 
 499. See supra notes 306–10 and accompanying text. 
 500. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text (Romero); supra notes 244, 247 and 
accompanying text (Talisman I); supra notes 254–57 and accompanying text (Agent 
Orange). 
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conduct and remedies under the ATS.  By failing to do so, they opened their 
position up to criticism from opposing jurists as merely based on principles 
of fairness and not rooted in any substantive ATS principle.501  Yet as this 
Note demonstrates, the ATS and Supreme Court jurisprudence mandate that 
when the conduct of a corporation violates international law, a plaintiff is 
entitled to a cause of action based on principles of federal common law.502
CONCLUSION 
  
With the issue of corporate liability at the forefront of the debate following 
Kiobel, courts must act quickly to articulate a clearer set of choice of law 
principles based on the distinction between standards of conduct and 
remedial issues, or risk having the Second Circuit’s reasoning further 
adopted across circuits. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel shattered the already fractured 
landscape of ATS jurisprudence existing within the United States.503  
Although Sosa in many ways achieved its goal by articulating a standard for 
what constitutes a violation,504 the opinion offered inherently inconsistent 
advice as to who can be held liable.505  With the recent flurry of suits 
against corporate entities,506 courts finding in favor of liability have 
struggled to articulate a coherent rationale behind their holdings.507  This 
Note identified the contrary holdings courts have reached based in part on 
the varying choice of law principles applied.508  In the wake of Kiobel, 
courts must provide a fundamental reassessment of their overall approach to 
determining which body of law applies to questions arising under the ATS.  
A framework based on the distinction between standards of conduct, which 
are governed by international law, and remedies, which are controlled by 
domestic law, offers judges a valuable starting point in their analysis.509
 
 
 
 501. See supra notes 335–39 and accompanying text (discussing Nestle’s holding that 
arguments based on principles of fairness have no bearing on what norms of international 
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